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A. Introduction
Since merger control law was first introduced in both the United
1 2
States and West Germany it has been argued that the preservation of
a competitive process leads to sacrifices in business efficiency.
Only a very large firra could be in a position, to realize significant
efficiencies and be internationally competitive. Thus, it has been
contended that measures to prevent concentration in the countries'
industries frustrate the attainment of merger-engendered efficiencies
3
and technological progresslveness
.
To a limited extent the German legislator gave in to these
arguments which were mainly voiced by businessmen and economists. On
the basis of section 24(3) GWB firms can put forward the social
desirability of efficiencies as a defense to an otherwise anticompeti-
tive merger. Nevertheless the strict prerequisites of such a defense
and its place in merger analysis signal that the preservation of a
competitive structure is conceived to be the main safeguard for the
efficiency-yielding potential of firms. Sacrificing competition for
business efficiency remains the exception.
American antimerger law lacks such a possibility. It does not
break with the principle of competition and rejects any instrumentali-
zation of anticompetitive mergers in order to gain a result which is
otherwise expected from an unconcentrated market. As Fox summarizes:
"Faced with the choice between promoting cost-savings of firms with
economic power and protecting freedom and opportunity of
1
firms without economic power, the Supreme Court declared that the lav
4
favored the latter." On the contrary, as Part B will demonstrate a
post-merger firm's increased efficiency has sometimes becom.e the
rationale for condemning, rather than upholding a merger.
In the early 1970's the economic conditions in both countries
began to change dramatically: Domestic firms had to face fierce
competition from abroad which, in turn, lead to high levels of
unemployment. The call for more business efficiency became louder."
Despite similar economic problems, both countries* merger control
policies differ substantially as to the way increased efficiency
should be achieved. German merger control policy continued to adhere
to the concept of preserving a competitive market structure conducive
to rivalry among numerous market participants and in turn to productive
and allocative efficiency. In contrast, American merger control
policy has shifted away from this principle and regards increased
autonomy of firms as a superior route to efficiencies. Non-inter-
vention in the marketplace is preferred over measures to constrain
concentration.
Efficiencies are treated as a beneficial factor in merger analysis
as Part C and Part D will demonstrate. Stated very briefly, the
competitive effects examination under section 7 Clayton Act is under-
going a change from a structuralistic analysis studying the long-term
consequences of an industry's market structure to an efficiency
analysis studying the short-term effect of a merger on the industry's
6
output and prices.
The reasons for this shift in American merger control policy can
be found in a conservative political ideology and — going hand in
hand — changes in economic thinking.
This thesis will deal with the way an affirmative consideration
of efficiencies can be incorporated into merger analysis.
In Part B the role of efficiency considerations under existing
U. S .-American and West German merger control law will be analyzed. It
will conclude that section 7 Clayton Act does not accoiranodate an
efficiency justification to an otherwise anticompetitive merger. Part
C and part D discuss the theoretical explanations and methods for an
affirmative consideration of efficiencies in merger analysis which are
advocated by U. S .-American economists and legal scholars. Part E
proposes a public interest exemption clause to address efficiency
claims of firms raised in defense of an anticompetitive merger.
NOTES
1. Section 7 of the Clayton Act was enacted in 1914 (Ch. 323, §7, 38
Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1982)) and amended by the Celler-Kefauver Act (Ch. 1184, 64
Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982)).
2. German meger control law was enacted in 1973 (Second Amendment to
the Law Against Restraints of Competition of August 4, 1973,
[1973] BGBL.I. 917).
3. See Note, "Substantially To Lessen Competition ..." Current
Problems of Horizontal Mergers, 68 Yale L. J. 1627, 1654 (1959)
(summarizing and discussing earlier complaints against antitrust);
see also Dirlam & Kahn, Fair Competition: The Law and Economics
of Antitrust Policy 10-11 (1954); Fox, The Modernization of
Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1140, 1144 n. 13
(1981) ("the 'new' criticism of antitrust is, in fact, not new.)
For a summary of German literature on this topic, see Schmidt,
Wettbewerbstheorie und — politik 56-68 (1981).
4. Fox, supra note 1, at 1142.
5. See Fox, The 1982 Merger Guidelines: When Economists are Kings,
71 Cal. L. Rev. 281, 283 (1983).
6. See Rowe , The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models:
The Faustian Pact of law and Economics, 72 Geo. L.J. 1511 (1984)
(delineating this development)
.
7. See Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics, and Politics: Reflections
on Some Recent Relationships, 68 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1980); see
also Fox, supra note 3, at 283, 297.
B. The Role of Efficiency Consideration under existing U. S .-American
and West German Merger Control Law: A Comparison
The aim of Part B is to analyse the role of efficiency considera-
tions in both U. S .-American and West German merger control lav. A
prime concern of this thesis is the inquiry into both laws as to the
existence of provisions for incorporating efficiency justifications
into the legal analysis of mergers. In the course of the subsequent
discussion it will however also be asked, to what extent both laws
regard the efficiency-yielding potential of a merger as anticompetitive.
In chapter I, the U. S .-American merger control law will be examined in
order to determine the availability of an efficiency defense. In this
respect, the wording of section 7 Clayton Act is ambiguous, so its
language has to be Interpreted by reference to this statute's legislative
history. Finally the Supreme Court's interpretations of section 7
Clayton Act must be scrutinized. Chapter II deals with the analysis
of the role of efficiency considerations in German merger control law.
The legislative history of German merger control law will be examined
in order to gain Insight into the purposes of section 22-2Aa GWB. The
focus of this thesis will then turn to the role of efficiency consider-
ations in section 24(1) GWB and 24(3) GWB. Chapter III concludes the
paper with a comparison of both laws in respect to the question at
issue
.
I. U. S. -American Merger Control Law: Section 7 Clayton Act
1 . Statutory Wording of Section 7 Clayton Act
5
The first issue is, whether the language of Section 7 Clayton Act
permits the consideration of efficiency gains as a justification for a
merger
.
The wording of Section 7 Clayton Act provides no clue. It is
phrased broadly and prohibits mergers or series of mergers that may
"substantially lessen competition." In contrast to the Section 22-24a
of the German Law against Restraints of Competition, Section 7 Clayton
Act gives no explicit guidance for the analysis of anticompetitive
2
effects resulting from a merger.
It leaves the task of defining the term "substantially to lessen
competition" to the courts. "Competition" can be defined in a multitude
of ways. Therefore the objectives of Section 7 Clayton can be viewed
very differently. Depending on the outlook adopted, an efficiency
defense is either permitted or rejected.
So much can be stated here: Assuming that procompetitive
3
effects could be achieved through merger- caused efficiency gains
these should clearly constitute a part of the "anticompetitive effects"
analysis proclaimed by Section 7 Clayton Act. Logic compels that a
procompetitive merger can not be anticompetitive. However, if
evaluation of certain criteria (such as market share data, the level
of concentration, the existence of barriers to entry) have lead to the
conclusion that a merger in a relevant market is anticompetitive, it
is difficult to conceive how it still can be justified by procompetitive
effects in the same market. A different question is, whether power
gains of a merger in one market can be balanced against procompetitive
effects caused by the same merger in another market.
The statutory wording of section 7 Clayton Act is ambiguous. It
neither compels nor forecloses the consideration of efficiencies in
merger analysis.
2. Legislative History
The language of section 7 Clayton Act requires interpretation by
reference to this statute's legislative history in order to determine
the role of efficiency considerations In merger enforcement.
Congress did not agree on precise standards or norms for the test
of competitive effect prescribed by the Act, but rather left such a
determination to the Courts. It is therefore necessary to examine
the Congressional concerns prompting the enactment of the Clayton Act
and the Celler-Kefauver Amendment and to identify the dominant values
of U. S .-American merger control Law. A prime goal of this thesis is
to clarify the role of economic efficiency as a possible objective of
Congress. The analysis will focus on the question whether the legis-
lators acknowledged that the same merger leading to a gain in market
power could also enhance the achievement of efficiencies.
It should be noted that this chapter does not attempt to give a
complete survey of the amended section 7 Clayton Act's legislative
history. Before discussing methods of incorporating efficiencies into
merger analysis, the author of this thesis has to predetermine his
view on the value-basis of merger control law. Proclaiming economic
efficiency as the sole goal of antitrust or acknowledging a multitude
of economic and non-economic values generates different opinions
concerning the validity of an efficiency defense.
Furthermore it has to be stated that this chapter will not deal
with the issue of whether merger policy should consider only
economic or both economic and noneconomic values. The literature will
only be cited in respect to different perceptions of the legislative
history.
a . Congressional concerns other than the promotion of economic
... . 8
efficiency
Congress' dominant concern, prompting the 1950 Celler-Kefauver
Amendment, was the rising Industrial concentration in the American
9
economy. Alarm about the economic, social and political effects of
this change in market structure wase the common spirit emerging from
the committee reports and debates. The legislators aimed at dispersing
economic power and viewed competition as a process requiring numerous
participants and decentralization.
The political consequences of the ongoing merger movement
were clearly a major congressional concern: It was feared that the
domination of the American industry by a few corporate giants could
lead to the installation of totalitarianism, because too much power of
these economic groups would not be tolerated by the public and therefore
would lead to increased government control.
Antitrust law was intended to prevent any firm from having undue
access to the political system. In this respect the statement by
Representative Celler (one of the co-sponsors of the 1950 Celler-
Kefauver Amendment) points to the history of cartelizatior and
concentration of industry in Nazi-Germany, arguing that the industrial
12
monopolies brought Hitler to power and the world into war. This
shows how the state f antitrust law in Germany frvirtual nonexistent)
once served as a negative example, thereby, influencing the development
of U. S. -American merger control law.
The social implications of high levels of concentration were
time and time again addressed in the congressional debates: Legislators
lamented that the destiny of the people would be determined by decisions
13
of persons who lived far away. The local initiative and civic
14
responsibility would be diminished. Congress preferred a society
that was composed of small, independent, decentralized businesses.
Another (closely related) aim of the deconcentration policy
favored by the legislature was the preservation and enlargement of the
freedom of business opportunity. This objective has both
economic and non-economic ("populist") implications. The "chances
of the average man to make a place for himself in business " were to
be preserved. The individual, wanting to become an entrepreneur,
should have free access to markets, his chances shouldn't be restricted
by barriers to entry. The freedom of action of the small entrepreneur
was to be secured by maintaining a market structure conducive to
competition, limiting the discretion of large corporations and placing
18
them under the discipline of the market.
Aneconomic concern, which can be derived from the legis-
lative history of the Clayton Act and Celler-Kafeuver Amendment, was
10
that mergers creating or increasing market power would lead to supra-
competitive pricing directly harming consumers. Instant rivalry among
numerous firms for a greater share of the market "was to protect
19
consumers from paying artificially high prices." Preventing trends
towards concentration in their incipiency was perceived to be the best
20
guarantee against this "unfair exploitation." Put into purely
economic terms, Congress wanted to protect consumers from unfair
21
transfers of wealth from buyers to sellers.
b. The improvement of economic efficiency as a congressional concern
Evidence of congressional concern with allocative inefficiency
can not be found in the legislative history of the 1914 Clayton Act
22
nor the 1950 Celler-Kef auver Amendment.
The legislators did, however, discuss the extent to which the
23
antimerger statutes could affect productive efficiency. The majority
in Congress believed that an anti-concentration policy would enhance
24
corporate efficiency. A possible conflict between the goals of
dispersing economic power and achieving corporate efficiency-through a
merger generating efficiencies as well as contributing significantly
to economic concentration-was not squarely addressed. Therefore it
must be asked, if Congress-recognizing a tradeoff situation-would have
regarded the achievement of efficiencies as justification for a merger
leading to a market power gain.
As shown in (a) , the legislative record reveals dominant concern with
the social, political and other economic (non-efficiency) effects of
the rising industrial concentration in the American economy. The
11
principal goal of the antimerger statutes was the dispersion of
economic power.
Thus, it can be concluded that Congress was not willing to forego its
market power concerns in order to increase corporate efficiency; i.e.
the legislators were willing to risk efficiency losses in order to
prevent a possible rise of concentration. The legislat . e history
suggests a clear inclination to resolve the above-mentioned conflict
in favor of a strict antimerger policy, not allowing an efficiency
defense
.
Some commentators, however, contend that Congress placed a
significant emphasis on efficiency as a goal of antimerger policy and
did not preclude an efficiency defense. On the contrary: Congress,
as is argued, believed that when efficiency exists, it should weigh in
27
favor of a merger. However, the evidence provided for this contention
28
is not convincing: The fact that efficiency concerns were incorporated
29into prior bills (in 1941-43) does not reveal a legislative intent
to let efficiencies count for a merger: These bills were disposed of
prior to the influential FTC-Report in 1948 describing the merger
30
movement in the American industry. Congress, confronted with the
report's information, was principally concerned with this change in
market structure. It can reasonably be concluded that efficiency
31justifications were consciously deleted.
Furthermore, the legislators' will to permit mergers between
relatively small firms enabling them to offer increased competition to
32larger companies
, is not sufficient evidence for the above-mentioned
12
33
point of view. Section 7 Clayton Act only forbids mergers leading
to a "substantial" lessening of competition. Mergers between small
companies do not have such a effect, they do not lead to a firm with a
sufficient degree of market power. Congress, therefore, merely wanted
... 34
to exempt de minimis mergers.
Thus, it can be concluded that Congress' dominant concerns were
the political, social and economic effects of the rising industrial
concentration in the American industry. The legislators aimed at the
dispersion of economic power in order to preserve a market structure
composed of numerous participants. The concern for the achievement of
corporate efficiency was secondary. It follows that—although the
conflict between the goals of dispersing economic power and achieving
corporate efficiency was not squarely addressed—Congress would not
have regarded the achievement of efficiencies as justification for a
merger contributing to economic concentration. In contrary: The
legislators were willing to risk efficiency losses in order to prevent
a possible rise of concentration.
3. Precedent
Part B of this thesis sets out to examine the state of existing
law concerning the availability of efficiency justificatici.' . Thus,
the Supreme Court's interpretations of section 7 Clayton Act, in
35
respect to this question, have to be examined. Any new development
3fi
in merger enforcement policy must be questioned as to its fealty to
the existing law derived from precedent.
13
a. Brovn Shoe
In 1955 the government brought a civil action alleging that the
purchase of a large independent retail chain of shoe stores (:G.R.
Kinney Company) by a large shoe manufacturer (: Brown Shoe) would
38
violate section 7 Clayton Act. The Court took efficiency considera-
tions into account when deciding upon the legality of the merger: It
pointed to cost savings associated with a vertical aspect of the
merger and the addition of distribution outlets to the acquiring
firm's manufacturing operation (so-called integration economies).
"The retail outlets of integrated companies, by eliminating wholesalers
and by increasing the volume of purchases from the manufacturing
division of the enterprise, can market their own brands at prices
39below those of competing independent retailers." The Court went on,
to squarely address the possible conflict between dispersing economic
power and achieving corporate efficiencies, which could be beneficial
to consumers: "Of course some of the results of large integrated or
chain operations are beneficial to consumers. . . But we cannot fail
to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the
protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses." By referring
to Congressional intent, the Court held that the principal goal of the
antimerger statutes was the dispersion of power, thereby preserving
41
for small business the opportunity to compete. The Court stated
that the above-mentioned conflict was resolved by Congress" in favor
42
of decentralization."
14
Ergo: The Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States found
that the increase in integration efficiencies and the subsequent
advantage thus gained over competitors supported the finding of
illegality, regardless of the potential benefits to consumers.
Consequently the efficiencies could not constitute a defense to the
A3
merger.
Some commentators have denied the value of this decision as
precedent, calling it "internally inconsistent" and "not definitive."
They refer to the passage just analyzed, contending: Since lower-cost
distribution was an objective of competition, it would be inconsistent
45
with the protection of less efficient rivals. These authors thereby
completely disregard that, in the Court's view, the law sought to
preserve an industrial structure composed of large numbers of small
competitors as an end in itself. The Court did not define competition
by reference to principles of productive or allocative efficiency, but
by reference to the dominant goal of decentralization. If competition
is defined in this way, no contradiction in Chief Justice Warren's
statement can be found: Competition is promoted by dispersion of
J 1 1 1 . A6power and not by lower-cost production.
b. Philadelphia Bank
In 1961 the government challenged a merger between the Philadelphia
National Bank (PNB) and the Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank (Girard)
,
47
the second and third largest banks in the Philadelphia area. The
Court rejected all the affirmative justifications which appellees
offered for the proposed merger. The argument that the resulting
15
bank—due to its increased lending limit—would be better able to
compete with the larger New York banks was struck down: "We reject
48
this application of the concept of 'countervailing power'."
Efficiencies promoting competition in one market could not trade off
the anticompetitive effects in another market.
Furthermore the defendant argued that the merger should be upheld
because Philadelphia needed a larger bank to develop new business and
stimulate economic development. The Court commented: "We are
clear, however, that a merger the effect of which 'may be substantially
to lessen competition' is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning
of social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial.
A value choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of
judicial competence, and, in any event, has been made for us already,
by Congress when it enacted the amended § 7. Congress acted to
preserve our traditionally competitive economy. It therefore proscribed
anticompetitive mergers, the benign and malignant alike, fully aware,
we must assume that some price might have to be paid."
It is difficult, however, to read this statement as the preclusion
of an efficiencies defense, because of the context in which it was
made. The defendant did not ask the Court to balance possible anti-
competitive effects of the merger against potential economies of scale
but rather against other beneficial impacts on the Philadelphia
community. The economic benefits, mentioned in the quoted passage,
directly refer to benefits to the economic environment of the
Philadelphia community and not to benefits generated by low-cost
production.
16
c . Proctor & Gamble
In 1967 the Supreme Court found illegal a product extension
merger between ths leading manufacturer of household liquid bleach
(Clorox Chemical Company), and a large, diversified manufacturer of
household products, including laundry soaps and detergents (tProctor &
53Gamble)
. The claimed efficiencies in this case were reductions in
the cost of brand name promotion through quantity discounts and
financial economies (reduction of credit costs) . The Court held that
an efficiency defense under section 7 of the Clayton Act is not
available: "Possible economies cannot be used as a defense to
illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competi-
tion may also result in economies but struck the balance in favor of
protecting competition." The efficiencies were, to the contrary,
treated as an additional basis for challenging the merger.
Despite the Court's clear language, som.e commentators contend
that the above quoted passage does not preclude an efficiency justifi-
57
cation:
They stress that the Court only mentioned "possible" economies and
economies that "may" result from mergers that lessen competition.
Thus, the Court would not ignore relatively certain economies from
CO
mergers. This narrow reading of the judicial language disregards
the Court's reference to the legislators' will to risk efficiency
59
losses in order to prevent a possible rise of concentration. The
dominant Congressional value was competition in the sense of a favorable
fiiarket structure composed of a large number of competitors. Even
17
relatively certain efficiency gains from an otherwise anticompetitive
merger could not therefore constitute a defense under the Proctor &
Gamble decision.
Furthermore the commentators find the above-mentioned passage
"confusing" : Economic theory, establishing that efficiency is one
(if not the dominant) value of competition, would compel courts to
examine the existence and magnitude of economies. The Court (or a
rational court) could not have meant to brush the question of
efficiencies aside. But, in fact, the Court wanted to do just that:
Ignore efficiencies altogether.
Muris and Areeda-Turner simply do not want to face the fact that
the Court did not define competition in efficiency terms but in a
structuralistic sense and that the Court really meant what it said.
It can, therefore, be concluded that the Supreme Court in the
Proctor & Gamble decision rejected an efficiency defense. To the
contrary, as can be inferred from this decision as well as the Brown
Shoe case, efficiencies were treated as an additional basis for
challenging the merger. Thus, an efficiency defense is not available
under section 7 Clayton Act.
II . West German Merger Control Law: Section 22-24a GWB
To ascertain the role of efficiency considerations in German
merger control law a different mode of analysis than that employed in
the evaluation of U. S .-American merger control law is necessary.
There are has two reasons for this.
18
First, the statutory language of section ll-llj,a GWB is much irore
explicit than section 7 Clayton Act. The legal structure of the
German antimerger statutes and their legislative history reveal
clearly, if, and under which conditions, efficiency considerations
should be incorporated into the legal analysis of mergers. The
significance of the judicial decisions lies in interpreting these
provisions and determining their outer limits.
Second, the role of precedent (stare decisis) is a unique feature
of Anglo-American Law and therefore unknown to German Law. In practice,
however, the decisions of the Supreme Courts (Bundesgerichtshof ) are
generally followed by lower courts.
As will be seen, section 24(1) GWB and Section 24(3) GWB provide
for ways of integrating efficiency justifications into the legal
examination of mergers. One could therefore immediately focus on the
contents of these two statutes. This procedure, however, is not
advisable. The construction of these statutes and the assessments of
chair limits, depends heavily on the "policy of the law," i.e. the
goals of German m.erger control law.
Thus in subchapter (1) the legislative history of German merger
control law will be screened in order to gain insight into the purposes
of section 22-24a GWB. Furthermore the reader will be familiarized
with the contents of the German antimerger statutes.
Subchapter (2) will focus on the role of efficiency considerations
in section 24(1) GWB and 24(3) GWB.
19
1 . Legislative History and Objectives of German Merger Control
Law
(a) Not until 1973 was the German merger control law introduced,
64
thereby amending the GWB
. The antimerger provisions can be
separated into two principal bodies of law: The reporting provisions
under sections 23 and 24a GWB and the substantive provisions under
sections 22, 23a and 24 GWB. Although this legal structure will be
surveyed more carefully further on, this much shall be stated here:
Under section 24(1) GWB, the Cartel Office is empowered to prohibit
mergers which are likely to create or further strengthen a market
dominating position. Like under section 7 Clayton Act the threshold
inquiry is directed toward the effects a merger is likely to have on
competition. The American law, however, intervenes at a lower degree
of competitive impact than does the German law, namely when a merger
is likely to substantially lessen competition or tends to create a
monopoly.
Two main causes of the enactment of the antimerger statutes may
be pointed out: Official inquiries into the concentration of the
German industry had led to a greater awareness of the growing merger-
movement. Additionally, a change in government had occurred in
1969: The social democrats (SPD)— in coalition with the liberal party
(FDP)—had taken over power for the first time in German post-war
history. In his first address to parliament, Chancellor Brandt
announced that the GWB should be modernized and supplemented by
preventive merger control provisions. The final draft of the
20
antimerger law stated that "problem number one of antitrust policy-
today is not any more cartelization but concentration." Concentration
was seen to be "dangerous" for both economical and socio-political
reasons. The economic concern was based on a
structure-conduct-perfonnance paradigm: A high level of concentration
would lead to a reduced use of competitive parameters and ultimately
to bad performance of the firms in the market, meaning less efficiency
and technical progressiveness . Thus, an unconcentrated market
structure was perceived to be the best guarantor for both higher
productive and allocative efficiency. Furthermore, the s o c i o-p o
1 i t i c a 1 implications of an increased concentration were
envisaged: Private economic power could constitute a threat to a free
CO
market economy ultimately endangering political democracy.
The principal goal of the legislators was therefore the dispersion
of economic power in order to maintain market structures that make
effective competition possible.
(b) This objective was carried further in the Fourth Amendment
to the Law Against Restraints of Competition of April, 1980, strengthening
69
the German merger control law. Official inquiries into the concen-
70
tration of the German industry by the Monopolies Commission triggered
this development of the law: Merger control had proven to be unsuc-
cessful in the prevention of certain kinds of concentration. Furthermore
it had not been sufficiently effective in the case of non-horizontal
mergers. The following provisions were, thus, enacted:
21
First, the small enterprises exemption of section 24(8) GWB was
narrowed to a considerable extent. Under this exemption mergers,
involving enterprises with a turnover of less than DM 50 million, were
exempted from prohibition. The aim of this clause was to enable small
(and medium-sized) businesses to sell out and merge at a good price.
This possibility would in turn attract newcomers to enter such
markets, and favor small entrepreneurship . The exemption, however,
turned out to be counter productive: Big corporations systematically
bought up small and medium-sized enterprises. Of the 42% of all
mergers exempted under section 24(8) GWB in 1978, 85% of these mergers
72involved giants with a yearly turnover exceeding 1.000 million DM.
This development led to an increasing trend towards concentration in
markets composed of small and medium-sized corporations: Especially
in the case of vertical mergers the small companies were deterred from
staying independent and competing against their vertically integrated
rivals. Combining with a strong firm ws often viewed as the only
73
means of survivial with a strong firm. Hence, section 24(8) GWB no
longer applies to those mergers in which the acquiring enterprise has
a 1.000 million DM turnover or more and the acquired enterprise a four
million DM turnover or less.
The same concern for small and medium-sized businesses led to the
enactment of section 23a(l) (1) (a)GWB. The creation or strengthening
of market domination shall be assumed, where an enterprise with a
turnover of 2,000 million DM merges with another enterprise in a
market in which small and medium-sized enterprises have a two-thirds
22
share of the market ard the merger will lead to a market share of at
least 5%.
The second presumptive rule enacted in 1980 mainly aims at a
better prevention of vertical and conglomerate concentration: The
market domination shall be presumed, where an enterprise with a 2,000
million DM turnover merges with an enterprise which has a dom.inant
position in one or more markets in which overall turnover is 150
million DM or more (Sect. 23a(l)(l)(b) GWB) . The experience with
German merger control since 1973 had shown significant difficulties in
preventing big enterprises from acquiring a market-dominating corporation
in a different market (unrelated to the activities of the acquiring
firm) . This can be explained by the fact that the German merger
control policy was mostly geared to market share data and the degree
of concentration in a specific m.arket. It had not sufficiently taken
into account the negative competitive effect arising when a leading
firm in a market is acquired by a powerful firm, thereby entrenching
the acquired firm's leading position.
The third-most controversial-provision presumes market domination
where the participating enterprises together have a 12,000 million DM
turnover and at least two of them have a 1,000 million DM turnover
each. (sect. 23a(l)(2) GWB). The legislators were concerned with the
accumulation of such resources because of their influence on the
concentration-climate in the country. It was thought that usually
these kind of so-called "marriages of elephants" would lead to a
78
market-dominating effect.
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The presumptions of section 23a GWB adopted in 1980 seem to imply
a merger policy directed against mere size. Their practical relevance,
however, is limited: Once the conditions of these provisions are met,
the Federal Cartel Office can tentatively presume the creation or
strengthening of a market-dominating position. After the merging
parties then adduce evidence, the enforcement agency must further
investigate these factors for the assessment of the merger's competitive
effect. Only if this investigation leads to a "non-liquet" situation
(where a doubt remains as to the merger's competitive effect), is the
presumption of market-domination relevant and attains substantive
. ... 79
significance
.
The presumptive rules of section 23a GWB, however, do signal that size
criteria ( : the resources of enterprises) shall play a more significant
role in the assessment of the competitive effects, particularly in the
case of vertical and conglomerate mergers.
To summarize, it can be stated that the Fourth Amendment to the
Law Against Restraints of Competition of 1980 shows the legislators'
concern with the deterrent effect mergers involving big enterprises
can have on small entrepreneurship . The increasing amount of vertical
and conglomerate mergers was perceived to be a threat to competition
in the German industry. The fight against concentration was therefore
strengthened, in order to preserve a market structure conducive to
effective competition; meaning a market composed of numerous enterprises,
by prohibiting the creation or entrenchment of market power. Thus,
smaller firms should be given a better chance to compete. This again
24
would make the market more attractive to newcomers; markets would be
opened to new competition.
It has been shovm that German merger control law has more than a
mere economic dimension. A chief function of its policy, directed
towards the dispersion of power, is the protection of the freedom of
. .
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economic activity
2 . The Role of Efficiency Considerations in Section 2A(1) GVB
and Section 24(3) GWB
Mergers leading to efficiency gains (hereinafter referred to as:
rationalization mergers) are relevant on three different levels of the
legal analysis under § 24 GWB: First, concerning the question of
whether or not if the merger leads to the creation or reinforcement of
a market-dominating position (§ 24(1) GWB); second, concerning the
question of whether the merger leads to the improvement in the conditions
of competition that outweigh the disadvantages of market dominance
(balancing clause in § 24(1) GWB); and third, in the context of the
public-interest exemption in § 24(3) GWB.
a. Efficiencies as another Basis for Invalidating a Merger
In German merger control law efficiency gains pxay a significant
role in determining whether a merger leads to the creation or reinforce-
ment of a market-dominating position. (§ 24(1) GVB) However, the fact
that the combination of two companies' resources leads to cost-savings
is — by itself — irrelevant in the context of § 24(1) GWB. That
which is determinative is the impact of these efficiencies on the
conditions of competition on a particular market, i.e. the market
structure
.
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This point can be clarified by looking at the formulation of the
anticompetitive-effects test put forth in § 24(1) GWB in connection
with § 22 GVB: According to these statutes the FCA shall prohibit a
merger, if it is to be expected that the merger will create or
strengthen a position of market domination. An enterprise (§ 22(1)
GWB) or an oligopolistic group (§ 22(2) GWB) is market-dominating if
it is not subject to any substantial competition or has a superior
market position in relation to its competitors. The latter
alternative has become decisive in merger control enforcement, because
it constitutes the lower threshold of competitive restraint and is
much easier to prove than the lack of substantial competition. The
superior market position - test necessitates a comparison between
competitors in a particular market: A firm has market power, if it has
a latitude of freedom of conduct in developing its market strategies
and determining its market behavior; i.e. the firm doesn't have to pay
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attention to the market conduct of its competitors. Section 22(1)
Nr.2 GWB gives examples for such a position of market dominance: In
addition to the enterprise's market share, particular regard shall be
given to its financial strength, its access to supply and sales
market, its corporate ties to other enterprises as well as to legal or
factual barriers to market access for other enterprises. The
significance of these indicators may be influenced by efficiencies of
a firm.
For example, a merger leading to significant efficiency gains may
increase barriers to entry in the relevant market.
This is possible by raising the minimum efficient scale of a firm in a
market through the achievement of economies of large scale or by
gaining absolute cost advantages, like technological economies (mostly
by sampling patents) or capital cost economies (e.g. by getting a
better access to financial markets). It is undisputed that these
effects deteriorate the structure of a market and may - together with
other factors such as market share and concentration indicators - lead
to the prohibition of a merger. Small potential entrants may be
intimidated from entering the market for fear that the larger firms'
competitive advantages may be so significant that they could be driven
out of the market again. In turn, efficiency-induced cost savings may
grant the larger enterprises additional pricing flexibility with which
to fight off new potential entrants.
Particularly obvious is the connection between efficiency gains
and a better access to supply and sales
m a r k e t s. Here competitive advantages can be achieved by minimizing
transactional costs through economies of integration (e.g. resulting
from the combination of the former enterprises' distribution networks).
These advantages may allow the merged firm to dominate the market
since other non-integrated rivals will be foreclosed from competing
for the merged firm's share of the relevant market. The number of
independent suppliers will decline leading to a market structure less
conducive to effective competition.
Any other competitive advantage generated by efficiencies of a
merged firm must also be taken into account when evaluating its market
27
position. The enumeration of factors in § 22(1) Nr. 2 GWB is not
comprehensive. In addition to from the mentioned financial economies,
also technological, management and plant — as veil as multi-plant
economies have to be considered. All of these advantages may serve
to further entrench the dominant position of an enterprise or create
such a position by discouraging smaller competitors from competing
83
aggressively.
The following decisions of the German Supreme Court illustrate the
importance of efficiencies in the context of the anticompetitive-effects
test in § 24(1) GWB. A more comprehensive description of these cases
is necessary for a better assessment of the role this factor plays in
the over-all examination, of whether a market-dominating position will
be created or reinforced by the merger. Like under US-American case
law relating to section 7 Clayton Act, the German Supreme Court has
examined the anticompetitive effects of efficiencies in the context of
entrenchment-cases: cost advantages gained by an acquired firm are
viewed as anticompetitive when the acquired firm is likely to become
more dominant through its acquisition by a larger, deep-pocket buyer.
The first two decisions which shall be described here, involve
horizontal mergers. Then, three cases involving product extension
mergers will be briefed.
The "Kloeckner-Becorit " case involved a merger between two
producers of equipment used in coal mines. The FCA prohibited this
merger according to § 24(1) and (2)(1) GWB because the resulting
company (Kloeckner-Becorit GmbH) would become market-dominating on the
28
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market for hydraulic shaft extension equipment in West Germany. The
8 5
Court of Appeals affirmed the FCA's decision and based its judgement
on two structural factors: first, the Kloeckner-Becorit GmbH would
have a 42% market share, which was significantly higher than its next
strongest competitor (only 30.7%). Second, the merging companies
would combine their technological capabilities in mining engineering,
enabling the Kloeckner-Becori r to enhance the technological innovation,
"thereby satisfying the needs of the consumer to a higher degree."
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which upheld the
Court of Appeal's contention that technical efficiencies could convey
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a competitive advantage to the merged company. This should be one
factor to be considered, when examining, if a market-dominating
88
enterprise had been created. The Court, however, disagreed with the
Court of Appeal's contention that a dominant market position could be
solely determined on the basis of market shares (being the most
"market-related" structural factor) , as long as other circumstances
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did not exclude a dominant latitude of freedom of conduct. The
Supreme Court judges held, that market share indices did not have such
an outstanding significance. Even though the Court of Appeals had
considered the (above mentioned) technical efficiencies generated by
the merger its analysis had placed too great an emphasis on the market
shares. All other significant structural factors should have been
duly considered. Therefore the Court reversed and remanded to the
Court of Appeals for further investigation into these matters.
In the merger case "Muenchener Anzeigenblaetter " the advertisement
newspaper Muenchener Wochenblatt, a wholly-owned subsidiary cf the
national newspaper Sueddeutsche Zeitung, acquired three of its competitors
in Munich. After the FCA prohibited this merger and the Court of
90Appeals affirmed, the case was appealed to the Supreme Court. In
1982 the Court held that through its acquisition, the Muenchener
Wochenblatt had achieved a paramount market position (§ 22(1) Nr.2
GWB) in three geographic submarkets for advertisement newspapers in
Munich. This creation of a market-dominating enterprise should be
91prohibited (according to § 24(1) GWB). The Court's finding was
based to a lesser extent on the market shares achieved by the merger
(in two cases they were below the presumptive threshold of 33 1/3%, §
22(3) (1) Nr. 1 GWB). The judges stressed that in some cases only the
overall consideration of the factors in 22(1) 2 GWB would lead to the
GO
assumption of a market-dominating position. ^ Here the Muenchener
Wochenblatt was backed by the considerable financial strength and the
strong position in the market for daily newspapers of its parent
corporation. The Sueddeutsche Zeitung would be able to give economic
and technical assistance to its subsidiary (e.g. by helping out with
needed staff or by cooperation with its advertisement department)
.
Together with the gained market shares of its competitors, and the
efficiencies achieved through these resources, the Munchener Wochenblatt
would achieve a paramount market position in the market for advertisement
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newspapers in Munich.
In October 1984 the Supreme Court decided the "Gruner & Jahr-Zeit "
case. The publishing house Gruner & Jahr intended to take an interest
30
in the Zeit, a highly reputed weekly political newspaper. The FCA had
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challenged this merger on three grounds. First, the paramount
market position of the Stern (published by Gruner & Jahr) on the
market for illustrated magazines would be further strengthened.
Second, the market dominating position of the Spiegel (in which Gruner
& Jahr held a 24.9% interest) on the market for weekly political
magazines would be reinforced. Both of these contentions were based
on the restraints of the still remaining competition that existed
because of the overlapping contents of these objects, the possibility
of developing a joint concept to strengthen their market positions and
improvements of their advertisement business. Third, the FCA contended
that a market dominating position of the Zeit on the market for weekly
political newspapers would be created.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Cartel Office's decision on all
three grounds and the case was appealed to the Supreme Court which
upheld the Court of Appeal's judgement concerning the first two
issues, but reversed and remanded the cause as far as the question of
Zeit's dominant market position was concerned. The Zeit held a share
of at least one third of the market for weekly political newspapers.
Even if it was still not presumed to be market dominating prior to the
merger (according to § 22(3) GWB) , a paramount market position could
97 98be created by Gruner & Jahr ' s resources. With respect to this
matter, the FCA had pointed to certain cost advantages which the Zeit
could achieve after merging with the publishing house (better access
to the archives and the photo material of the powerful magazine Stern
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and easy availability of services in the field of administration)
.
The substitution competition by the national daily newspapers would
affect the Zeit as well as all of its competitors in the same way. It
was therefore competitively neutral on the market for weekly political
newspapers and could not hinder the creation of a market dominating
X. ^ . 100position by the Zeit.
The m.ost recent conglomerate merger case " Edelstahlbestecke " decided
by the Supreme Court in June 1985 involved the take-over of the
Wuerttembergische Metallwarenfabrik AC 'WMF) by the Rheinmetall
Beteiligungsgesellschaf t (Rheinmetall) . Rheinmetall is a member of
a powerful Roechling-group with ample resources, which is active in
the metal working industry. WKF had a market share of over 30% for
cutlery made out of high-grade steel. In addition there were several
other structural advantages (e.g. the second largest competitor only
had one fourth of the WMF market share; the high market prestige of
the brand name WMF; cost-advantageous production in the Far East)
102leading to the Court's finding that WMF was market-dominating.
Although the merger did not raise the market shares of WMF, the Court
held that this dominant market position would be further secured and
103
consolidated by Rheinmetall ' s financial resources.
In a press statement Rheinmetall had declared its intention to
support WMF and increase its capital in order to enable it to expand.
After the merger, WMF had in fact stepped up its investments and
announced further investments. The Court argued that the competitors
would now — according to general experience — perceive WMF as even
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more motivated and determined to defend itself against any form of
competition than would be the case if its independence were preserved.
Thus, actual and potential competition would be discouraged. The
merger would lead to a reinforcement of WMF's market-dominating
lOAposition and should therefore be prohibited.
The entrenchment-doctrine of the German Supreme Court was further
enforc'-u by the FCA in the " IBH-Wibau " case. The acquiror, IBH,
was a financially strong producer of equipment for the building
industry. Wibau was market-dominating on the market for asphalt mix
plants due to its high and steadily increasing market share. Other
structural indicators could not rebut this finding since the competitors
didn't have larger financial or other resources at their disposal and
the market barriers were relatively high. The FCA determined that
IBH's financial resources and the improved access to the selling
market after the merger, would strengthen Wibau 's market-dominating
position by discouraging actual and potential competition. Wibau
would be able to make use of IBH's distribution network, its distribution
experience, its knowledge of the market and contacts to clients.
These distribution efficiencies would be enhanced by the fact that the
production programs c IBH and Wibau would add up to an all-embracing
range of products.
In this case the achievement of efficiencies leading to the
deterioration of the market structure was again seen as a reason to
invalidate a merger.
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Summary
German anti-merger statutes as well as the German Supreme Court's
interpretation of these statutes acknowledge that efficiency gains
leading to competitive advantages of the merged firm may have negative
affects on the conditions of competition on a particular market. In
this respect efficiencies can therefore be an additional basis for
invalidating a merger,
b. The Balancing Clause in Section 24(1) GWE
Even if a merger is likely to create or strengthen a market-dominating
position, the Federal Cartel Office must nevertheless allow it to go
through, if the participating enterprises can prove "that the merger
will also lead to improvements in the conditions of competition, and
that these improvements will outweigh the disadvantages of market
dominance." (§ 2A(1) GWB)
.
The Balancing Clause in General: Before turning to the role of
efficiency considerations under section 24(1) GWB, some general
remarks concerning this provision shall be made.
Usually the improvement of competitive conditions can not occur
in the same market in which the merger leads to a dominating
position. In determining whether to prohibit the merger, the Federal
Cartel Office has already made a prognosis about the likely future
competitive developments caused by the merger in a relevant market.
If the merger has led to an improvement of competitive conditions in
this market, an assumption of market dominance could already be
excluded. The competitive conditions in a dominated market can only
be improved in the case of "failing company" mergers.
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Therefore the balancing clause was mainly justified by the
argument that mergers which lead to market-dominating positions
frequently have a beneficial effect upon competitive conditions in
different markets. Then the deterioration of competitive
conditions caused by the creation of market-domination in the one
market has to be balanced against the improvement in competitive
108
conditions in the other market* As already mentioned in Part
11(3) (b) the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Philadelphia
109
National Bank rejected this concept of "countervailing power." The
balancing clause is therefore a uniquely German feature of merger
control law.
The wording of § 24(1) GWB ("c ompetitive conditions")
implies that the Federal Cartel Office may only evaluate aspects of
competition in certain markets, and is prohibited from analyzing the
overall effects of the merger on the economy. The latter judgment
is made, if at all, upon application, by the Federal Minister of
Economics in the context of § 24(3) GWB. It is necessary to emphasize
that German Merger control law distinguishes clearly between the
evaluation of competition by the Federal Cartel Office and public
interest by the Federal Minister of Economics. The Cartel Office,
nevertheless, overstepped its competence in many instances and took
other aims of economic policy into account, such as avoidance of
unemplojrment or improvements in the regional or sectoral economic
111
structure
.
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Furthermore the wording of § 24(1) GWB ("competitive condi-
tions" implies that— like in the case of the determination of
market domination-only structural factors are relevant; i.e. an
improvement in the conditions of competition, is only possible, if the
merger leads to a favorable market structure guaranteeing more
112
competition. Purely internal, microeconomic , advantages caused by
a merger (e.g. efficiencies), enabling the firms to
enhance their market position, can, therefore, not be considered in
the context of § 24(1) GWB. Consequently, the achievement of efficiencies
on the firm level has to have some impact on the structure of the
market, thereby improving the conditions for competition. Thus,
merger-caused efficiencies must guarantee a more effective competition
1 13in order to be considered under § 24(1) GWB.
Rationalization-mergers in the context of § 24(1) GWB: The above
mentioned principles shall first be illustrated by the Supreme Court's
treatment of efficiency considerations in the context of the balancing
clause in § 24(1) GWB.
The leading case on the balancing clause is "Erdgas Schwaben ".
In 1976 the FCA challenged the establishment of a joint venture
between the electricity supply enterprise Lech-Elektrizitaetswerke AG
(LEW) , the gas and electric power supplier Aktiengesellschaf t fuer
Licht und Kraf tversorgung (LK) and the City of Augsburg, which had set
up its own gas and electric utility. The purpose of the joint venture
(named: "Erdgas Schwaben GmbH") was the supply of natural gas in
Swabia (a county in the German state Bavaria) . Each partner had one
36
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third of the holdings. The prohibition order of the FCA claimed
that this joint enterprise would lead to the strengthening of the
dominant market position of LEW on the electricity supply market in
Swabia. Additionally, a market dominating position of the "Erdgas
Scwaben Gm.bH" on the gas supply market in the same region would be
created since LEW and LK would be eliminated as potential com.petitors
.
] 1 R
The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision of the FCA.
119
Further appeal was taken to the Federal Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court confirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals
regarding the reinforcement of LEW's dominant market position in the
electricity supply market. LEW would be able to influence the decisions
of the joint venture in correspondence with its own interests, even
120
though it only held one third of Erdgas Schwaben's holdings. The
powerful electricity supplier would now be able to prevent the construc-
tion of new gas lines especially during the (initial) investment phase
121
of the market. Thus, LEW would be able to hinder the substitution
competition between gas and electricity thereby strengthening its
market-dom.inating position.
122
The Court then focused on the balancing clause of § 24(1) GWB.
The enterprises had claimed that the planned joint venture would lead
to improvements in competitive conditions because gas could now enter
into substitution competition with fuel oil in the market for room
heating. This procompetitive effect would outweigh any anticompetitive
effects resulting from their endeavors.
37
The Court held that an approval according to § 24(1) GWB can only
be granted if competitive conditions are likely to be better after the
merger and a similar improvement in competitive conditions is not
likely without the merger. It is part of the merging enterprises
burden of proof to show that no alternatives exist which would enable
gas to enter into competition with oil as quickly and effectively as
123
the planned joint venture.
Here the FCA had contended that LEW and LK were able to build up
a gas utility in Swabia independently. Both companies replied that
only an optimal plant size with a sharing of the high risks, which
could only be accomplished by the proposed joint enterprise, could
12A
assure an effective competition with oil. In this respect the
Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals had failed to consider
adequately the parties' contention that the merger would lead to
substantial efficiencies. It had been claimed that LEW's participation
in the joint venture would better the technical services and customer
relationships, lead to the common use of rights-of-way, render possible
the common organization of meter reading and customer credit services
125
and create further overhead economies. These microeconomic advantages,
the judges held, might enable gas to enter into competition with fuel
oil more quickly and effectively than would be the case without the
merger. The Court reversed the Court of Appeal's judgement. On
remand an expert witness should be heard on the extent of possible
efficiencies and their future competitive impact. If only the participation
of LEW in the joint venture would lead to an improvement in competitive
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conditions, "then the Court of Appeals will have to examine whether
the improveinents brought about by this cooperation outweigh its
,. , ^ ,,126accompanying disadvantages.
In two earlier cases the FCA had outlined the limits of
efficiency justifications in the context of the balancing clause in §
24 (1) GWB.
In the "Haindl-Holtzmann " case the FCA prohibited the merger of
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two major domestic newsprint producers. Prior to this proposed
merger the level of concentration on the Vest German newsprint market
was already sufficient to presume a market-dominating oligopoly
according to § 22(3) Nr.2.a. GWB. The merged firm together with its
two remaining competitors would have controlled two-thirds of that
market. The FCA argued that the Haindl-Holtzmann company would
prevent an expansion of capacity, thereby further restricting output
of newsprint. Foreign competition from Scandinavian companies was
restricted because cf EEC-import duties. Thus the merger amounted to
a further strengthening of this oligopoly's market-dominating position,
The parties had attempted to justify the proposed merger by
referring to the balancing clause in § 24 (1) GWB. They claimed that
the larger merged firm would have better access to funds and therefore
more investment resources, thereby strengthening its competitiveness.
The FCA held that the combination of both firms' potential may be an
improvement of the market position of the planned merger but not an
improvement of the structure of the domestic newsprint market. The
•latter, however, is decisive in the context of the defense in § 24(1)
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GWB. The enforcement agency, furthermore, found no conclusive evidence
for the companies' contention that they would have to exit the market
and a higher degree of market concentration than without the merger
would occur, if they were not able to Increase their competitiveness
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in the desired way.
In the "Bitumen-Verkaufsgesellschaf
t
" case, the FCA challenged
the establishment of a joint venture between four large oil refiners
to be known as "Bitumen-Verkaufsgesellschaf t" for the purpose of
130
selling liquid asphalt. Prior to the planned merger, the largest
sellers on the market for liquid asphalt had a combined market share
of 50% and therefore a superior market position in relation to their
smaller competitors. The parallel development of their prices as well
as market shares showed that no substantial competition between this
group of companies existed. Thus, these enterprises were deemed to be
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market-dominating according to § 22(2) GWB. The joint venture
would result in another seller of the same size as the oligopolists
and therefore lead to a further strengthening of the market-dominating
oligopoly.
The FCA rejected the parties' contention that the joint venture
would lead to improvements in conditions of competition and that these
improvements would outweigh the disadvantages of market dominance. (§
24(1) GWB). In this respect the enterprises had claimed that the
establishment of the joint venture would lead to the achievement of
substantial efficiencies. The FCA, however, determined that efficiency
gains at the firm level could only be taken into consideration in the
40
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context of the structure of the market. Consequently, it had to be
determined whether the newly created strong offeror would be able to
enter into competition with the companies which had controlled the
133
market previously, thereby loosening the existing oligopoly.
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The enforcement agency saw "no realistic grounds" for supposing
such a development. If a new company were added "to the transparent
market for the relatively homogenous product liquid asphalt, the
135interdependence between the equally strong offerors would increase."
Beneficial market effects accruing from the joint venture were not
probable.
Recently the FCA applied the holding of the Supreme Court in
"Erdgas Schwaben" to two similar factual situations in the energy
supply market.
In "Gasversorgung-Schwanewede " the Stadtwerke Bremen AG (StdW)
and the gas utility Gasversorgung Wesermuende GmbH (GWM) had agreed to
establish a joint venture in equal partnership, to be known as
"Gasversorgung Schwanewede GmbH" (GV SchW.) for the purpose of supplying
1 o/:
gas in Schwanewede (a small community outside of Bremean) . The
electric utility Ueberlandwerke Nord-Hannover AG (UNH) , which monopolized
the supply of electricity in that town, held a 50% interest in GWM.
The FCA argued that the U^fH, through its interest in the GWM, would be
able to influence the decisions of the planned joint venture, especially
during the opening of the gas supply market. According to economic
experience UNH would try to protect itself from the competitive threat
of the other energy source (e.g. by the prevention of the introduction
41
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of gas supply into certain areas). Thus, the potentially remaining
competition on the energy supply market would be restrained, if not
eliminated. The market dominating position of UNH on the electric
supply market in Schwanevede would consequently be strengthened.
The FCA rejected the parties' argument that the merger would lead
to substitution competition between gas and fuel oil and therefore
1 38
should be approved according to § 2A(1) Alt. 2 GWB. It had not
been proven that an equal effect was not likely to occur as quickly
and effectively without the joint venture. On the contrary, the
enforcement agency showed that "the partners of the planned Gasversorgung
Schwanewede were able to establish a gas supply in Schwanewede indepen-
dently by taking a normal entrepreneurial risk," since the StdV and
the GWM operated gas utilities in neighboring towns without the help
of partners. "UNH's and StdW's intention to m.inimize the entrepreneurial
risk by setting up a joint venture may make sense from the companies'
point of view. These thoughts should however, not lead to the legalization
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of competitively objectionable effects from a merger."
The second case ("Thueringer Gas - Westerland ") involved a joint
venture between the only electric supply utility (Stadtwerke Westerland)
and the only gas supplier (Thueringer Gas AG) on the island of Sylt.
The resulting company (Stadtwerke Westerland GmbH) would have offered
all of the main-controlled energy on this geographic market. The FCA
prohibited this merger, because substitution competition between the
two energy sources, gas and electricity, would have been eliminated
and the Stadtwerke Westerland 's market-dominating position on the
42
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electricity supply market would have been strengthened. The
enforcement agency stressed that in a highly concentrated market only
minor further deteriorations of the market structure suffice to apply
§ 24(1) GWB.-^^-^
In February 1985 the Court of Appeals reversed the Cartel Office's
142decision. It held that competition between gas and electricity on
the submarkets for central heating, central warm water supply, decen-
tralized warm water supply and cooking was either non-existent or not
substantial. The merger-caused restraint of competition was therefore
143insignificant. On the other hand the joint venture would have
beneficial effects upon the competitive conditions in the submarket
for central heating. Here a fuel oil supplier held a 80% market
share. The merger would have enabled gas to enter into competition
with fuel oil more quickly and effectively than would be the case
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without the merger. The Court of Appeals based its judgement on an
extensive discussion of the efficiencies generated by the joint
venture and held that efficiencies, "with which an enterprise could
challenge its dominant competitor, should be considered in the context
of the balancing clause in § 24(a) GWB, if one could expect that this
145increased competitiveness were, in fact, employed." It was found
that the electric utility Stadtwerke Westerland had prominent access
to the consumer. The owners of existing houses already had a long
lasting contact with this enterprise and the builders of new house.'^
would anyhow have to contact an electricity supplier. Consequently,
the joint enterprise had a better chance to sell gas than an independent
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gas supplier. Furthermore, distribution economies were possible
because the Stadtwerke was well-staffed in all parts of the island.
Other overhead economies and administrative synergies were seen to be
existent
.
The judges conceded that it was "impossible to assess the extent
1A6
of these rationalization advantages." However, according to
general economic experience the efficiencies would have an appreciable
market effect. Since lively competition was expected in the submarket
for central heating, the companies would make use of their increased
competitiveness. The joint venture would be better able to enter into
competition with the dominant fuel oil supplier in this market.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that the insignificant
anticompetitive effects of the merger were outweighed by its procompet-
itive effects.
Catch-up mergers: Claims of efficiencies leading to an increased
competitiveness also play a role in the context of so-called catch-up
mergers in oligopoly situations. In several cases, the FCA allowed
mergers to go through even though the presumptive thresholds of
illegality were passed, if the merger would reduce the distance
between the merging enterprises and the market leader. The enforce-
ment agency believed that the resulting, more "symmetrical," oligopoly
would constitute an improvement in the conditions of competition. An
illustrative example is the Benteler-Niederrheinstahl case. By
acquiring a 50% share of the NRS-Niederrheinstahl GmbH the Benteler-
group obtained the second highest market share, though still falling
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short of the market leader Mannesmann. The prohibition of this merger
would have led to a further strengthening of Mannesmann' s market-
dominating position. Allowing the combined enterprises to catch up
with Mannesmann, thus a more balanced market structure, was seen to be
an improvement in the conditions of competition on the particular
market
.
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This enforcement practice of the FCA has been heavily criticized,
149
especially by the Monopolies Commission. The above mentioned view
in effect, legitimizes all mergers creating market positions below the
level of the market leader. This would entail further concentration
in the particular market, since the remaining oligopolists would now
aim at reaching the market leader's market share by merging, without
having to fear a prohibition order of the FCA. A more concentrated,
narrower oligopoly would increase oligipolistic interdependence and
the chances for collusion between the firms. Catch-up mergers would,
furthermore, impair the competitiveness of the remaining independent
enterprises. This would be detrimental to the conditions of competition
since the remaining oligopolistic competition would be preserved by
these firms.
The Monopolies Commission found its position corroborated by
pointing to U. S .-American merger control law and enforcement practices.
The Commission stressed that section 7 Clayton Act is intended to
prevent restraints of trade in their incipiency and thereby intervenes
at a lower degree of competitive impact than the German anti-merger
statutes. Justifications for anticompetitive mergers were not available
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under American law. This comparison would show the general impact of
the FCA's practice on competition policy.
Summary
Internal, microeconomic advantages like efficiencies enhance a
merged firm's market position. They don't necessarily affect the
structure of a market. Therefore, in general, they can not be considered
in the context of § 24(1) GWB. However, it has been shown that the
achievement of efficiencies on the firm level can have a beneficial
impact on the structure of a market, thereby leading to the improvement
of competitive conditions in the sense of § 24(1) GWB. This shows the
ambivalent nature of concentration in industries. Both anticompetitive
and procompetitive effects can evolve from this phenomenon and have to
be given weight in the legal analysis of mergers.
c. The Public-Interest Exemption in Section 24(3) GWB
If the Federal Cartel Office has vetoed a merger, a second line
of defense is available to the participating enterprises: Upon
application, the Federal Minister of Economics must permit the merger,
if the restraint of competition is balanced by the overall economic
advantages of the merger or if the merger is justified by an overriding
public interest. Competitiveness outside Germany is also to be
considered. (§ 24(3) GWB) It is further codified in this public-
interest exemption that the authorization may only be granted if the
extent of the restraint of competition does not endanger the principle
of the market economy. Insofar as the restraint of competition by the
merger is concerned, the decision of the Federal Cartel Office is
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binding. However, the Minister exercises discretion in determining
the weight to be given to those findings in making his evaluation.
Overall economic advantages can include the strengthening of
industrial branches important to the economy as a whole, the
preservation of unhealthy or failing companies (the most important
case) and the achievement of efficiencies from a merger. Overriding
public interests can be positive social benefits (i.e. the
preservation of jobs), promotion of health, military need or other
political interests.
The Minister has been seized only in very few cases. In a single case
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the Minister refused permission, in five others the permission was
153granted, most with restrictions or conditions attached to it.
Section 24(3) GWB constitutes a compromise. It pays tribute to
the conservative German legal political communities who had prevented
the introduction of a merger control law since the early 50's.
Especially in these first years of antitrust thinking, the German
154industry asserted its historically powerful position in order to
fight any attempt to establish an effective antitrust law, including
measures to prevent concentration in the German industry. These
forces were assisted by the conservative Christian Democratic Union
party, who held power until 1969. The main concern voiced against
antimerger statutes was the possible loss of merger-caused efficiencies.
The report of the Committee for Economic Policy of the German Parliament
in 1957 expressed a fear that the full development of the tendency
towards optimal plant size could be hindered by a merger policy.
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The inclusion of § 24(3) GWB into the merger control law enacted in
1973 shows that the Social Democratic/Free Democratic party also felt
obliged to make concessions to the German industry.
The German legislator has, thus, not given com.petition absolute
priority over other policy considerations. In reference to efficiency
considerations in the context of § 24(3) GWB, the following can be
stated: Generally German merger control law views efficiencies as the
result of a free competitive process. A market composed of a multitude
of enterprises was perceived to be the best guarantor for both higher
productive and allocative efficiency (see already Part III (1) (a)).
§ 24(3) GWB, however, acknowledged that a conflict may exist between
the goals of achieving corporate efficiency and dispersing economic
power, in the case of a merger leading to market domination but also
generating significant efficiencies. To a certain, limited extent,
the provision breaks with the principle of freedom of competition and
instrumentalizes mergers in order to achieve a higher degree of
corporate efficiency; i.e. an otherwise anticompetitive concentration
process is allowed in order to gain a result which is otherwise
J , 157expected from an unconcentrated market.
The wording and legislative history of § 24(3) GWB as well as the
purpose of German Merger Control Law, however, clarify that this
provision can only be applied in a very limited manner. The following
remarks shall outline these limitations in respect to the significance
of efficiencies in the context of § 24(3) GWB. My thesis will in
subsequent chapters further elaborate on the scope of the efficiency
defense provided for by this provision.
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Many of the limitations accruing from the public interest exemption
in § 24(3) GWB have already been voiced in the legislative history:
The Government Report accompanying the bill for the Second Amendment
1 58
of the Law against Restraints of Competition in 1971 stated that
the criteria "overall economic advantages" and "overriding public
interest" required in each case the existence of a general policy
justification for the merger. Authorization should only be granted if
these reasons were of great importance in the particular case, were
proved concretely and if governmental assistance measures promoting
the competitive system were not possible. It should be taken into
account that mergers basically result in long-term solutions that are
not reversible. Under § 24(3) GWB grounds for authorization would
have to be based on high demands in regard to their foreseeable
duration.
The wording of the public interest exemption ("overall economic
advantages") implies that— like in § 24(1) GWB
—
purely microeconomic
advantages, like merger-caused efficiencies of the participating
^ . . . . 160
enterprises, can not justify an otherwise anticompetitive merger.
Thus, the microeconomic advantages must lead to some kind of beneficial
macroeconomic effect. This is undoubtedly the case if, as a result of
their cost-savings, the merged enterprises lower prices or if they
improve the quality of their products. The application of § 24(3) GWB
should, however, not be preconditioned on such a conduct, since
internal efficiencies achieved by enterprises are one of the major
reasons for macroeconomic growth in a country: The efficiency of an
49
economy is only the sum of the efficiencies of the enterprises it is
composed of. If the efficiency of an economy is considered to be
an overall economic advantage, this should also apply to the
efficiencies achieved on the firm-level.
The only qualitative restriction which 24(3) GWB requires,
is, that the merger leads to real economies in production, procurement
or distribution. Resource savings have to be achieved. Pecuniary
efficiencies, leading to lower costs but not real resource savings, do
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not constitute an overall economic advantage.
Since § 24(3) GWB requires a macroeconomic relevance of the
particular merger, certain quantitative restrictions are
implied: The microeconomic advantages accruing from the merger have
to reach a sufficient level in order to be viewed as "overall economic
advantages." Thus, only significant efficiencies can justify a merger
v. . . . . 163under the public interest provision.
Furthermore, the efficiencies must be u n i q u e to the merger.
This requires a determination as to whether the efficiency gains can
be achieved without creating competitive problems by, for example, a
takeover by a firm outside the industry or a takeover by a firm with a
small market share. Additionally the possibility of internal growth
by the enterprises has to be investigated. This restrictive precondition
of an efficiency justification under § 24(3) GWB can be inferred from
the wording of the provision, requiring that the overall economic
, , ... . ,- . . 164
advantages have to outweigh the restraint of competition.
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\</hen balancing the anticompetitive consequences of a merger with
its efficiency gains (constituting an overall economic advantage) , the
Federal Minister of Economics must take into account that anticompetitive
mergers result in long-term detrimental effects on the
competitive process. The resulting disadvantages can permanently
affect the consumers and competitors. In contrast, the microeconomic
advantages of efficiencies may only last for a s h o r t period of
165
time
.
The above mentioned principles shall be illustrated by the
following case:
The "VAW-Kaiser" case: In December 197A, the FCA struck down a
merger-plan between Kaiser Aluminum, a multinational enterprise active
in the aluminum industry and the VAW, the leading manufacturer of
aluminum in West Germany. The merger would have resulted in the
reinforcement or creation of market-dominating positions in several
specialized aluminum markets. Kaiser and VAW argued that the
merger would lead to improvements in the conditions of competition,
since otherwise, both companies would have to discontinue production
and leave these markets. However, if the merger were consummated, the
number of aluminum product producers would only be reduced by one.
The FCA rejected this argument, because the enterprises had not shown
conclusively that both of them would have to exit.
In January 1975, Kaiser and VAW applied to the Federal Minister
of Economics for permission to merge (§ 24(3) GWB) . The Minister
asked the Monopolies Commission to give its opinion concerning the
case (§ 24a(5)(7) GWB). Kaiser and VAW had claimed that operating
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efficiencies could be achieved through specializing their plants
producing semi-finished aluminum products. The production facilities
1 CO
could be modernized and completed by shifting machines. By bundling
the orders, the productive capacities could be better utilized,
resulting in a decrease of per unit costs. These efficiencies
fulfilled the quantitative and qualitative restrictions of § 24(3)
GWB, mentioned earlier. The Commission therefore acknowledged that
the merger would lead to an overall economic advantage (§ 24(3) GWB).
The efficiencies could also strengthen the international
competitiveness of Kaiser and VAW and insofar constitute an overriding
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public interest (§ 24(3) GWB). However, the Commission held that
almost the same efficiency gains could have been achieved by a
cooperative venture between the two companies in the field of
semi-finished aluminum products. This alternative would have
created less competition problems since a long-term change of the
market structure could have been prevented. Consequently the
efficiencies were not unique to the merger. The Commission also held
that also the other positive effects of the merger (securing the jobs
in the industry) did not outweigh the restraints of competition
resulting from the merger.
In his order of June 1975 the Minister of Economics refused to
take the factor of job-security into account since a prognosis of
long-term employment effects of the merger or its prohibition were too
uncertain and the rationalization measures of the companies would
anyhow lead to dismissals. Concerning the other points, the
52
Minister came to the same conclusions as did the Monopoly Commission
and therefore refused to permit the merger.
Summary
Although § 24(3) GWB breaks with the principle of competition and
instrumentalizes anticompetitive mergers in order to achieve a higher
degree of corporate efficiency, it has been shown that several restric-
tions which can be derived from the legislative history, the wording
and the purpose of § 24(3) GWB diminish the scope of an efficiency
defense available under this provision.
The German legislator has therefore acknowledged that effective
competition is the best guarantor for the achievement of productive
efficiency, since it compels rationalizations and—most important
—
compels the firms to reduce prices and better the quality of their
products. In contrast, once an anticompetitive merger is allowed on
the basis of possible efficiencies accruing from it, the participating
enterprises could lose their interest in the achievement of efficiencies
and the lowering of prices after a certain period of time.
III. Conclusion
(1) The value-basis of the U. S .-American and the West German
merger control law is very similar. In both countries the legislators'
dominant concerns, prompting the enactment of the antimerger statutes,
were the political, social and economic effects of a rising concentration
in the respective countries' industries. The principal goal of the
legislators was to disperse economic power in order to preserve a
market structure composed of numerous participants and to protect the
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freedom of economic opportunity of the market participants. In both
countries the concern for the achievement of efficiencies was secondary.
(2) The U. S .-American Congress did not squarely address the
conflict between the goals of dispersing economic power and achieving
corporate efficiency, through a merger contributing significantly to
economic concentration as well as generating efficiencies. In view of
the legislators' principal concerns with the effects of concentration,
it can however be concluded that Congress would not have regarded the
achievement of efficiencies as justification for an anticom.petitive
merger.
Additionally, U.S. Supreme Court decisions concerning section 7
Clayton Act preclude an efficiency defense. Such a defense is therefore
not available under the existing U.S. American merger control law.
(3) In contrast to U. S .-American merger control law, the German
merger control law has provided two ways for incorporating efficiency
justifications into the legal analysis of mergers. In both cases,
however, the scope of such an efficiency defense is very limited.
In the context of the balancing clause in section 24(1) GWB
,
purely
internal, microeconomic advantages (such as efficiencies) do not
constitute an improvement in the conditions of competition required by
this provision. The achievement of efficiencies on the firm level
must have some impact on the structure of the market in order to be
considered under § 2A(1) GWB.
The public-interest exemption in § 24(3) GWB acknowledges that a
conflict may exist between the goals of achieving corporat efficiency
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and dispersing economic power. The provision breaks with the principle
of competition and allows an efficiency defense. However, the wording
and legislative history of § 24(3) GWB , as well as the purpose of
German merger control law, severely limit the number of cases in which
possible efficiencies could justify an anticompetitive merger under
this public-interest exemption.
(4) The development of U. S .-American merger control law could
borrow from the German experience with its efficiency justifications
(especially in respect to § 24(3) GWB). The basis for such a fertilization
is the similarity of both laws' approaches towards prohibiting anti-
competitive mergers and their similar objectives. However, the
discussion of the usefulness of an efficiency defense in U. S .-American
merger control law is strictly "de lege ferenda", since such a possibility
is not available under section 7 Clayton Act.
The subsequent discussion will deal with the theoretical explanations
(Part C) and methods (Part D) for an affirmative consideration of
efficiencies in merger analysis which are advocated by U. S. -American
economists and legal scholars.
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NOTES
1. Ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (codified as amended t
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982))
.
2. German Merger Control Law (§§ 22-24a GWB) (requiring a higher
threshold for challenging a merger than section 7 Clayton Act)
defines market power as a superior market position of an enterprise
in relation to its competitors. It points to certain indicators
for the existence of such a position and allows efficiencies
justifications rebutting the presumptive illegality of a merger.
3. Regardless of whether "competition": is defined merely by output-
restriction (welfare) theory or understood in a structuralistic
sense.
4. Rogers comes to the same conclusion by examining the question
whether section 7 precludes any substantial lessening of competition
caused by a merger or whether the statute is directed to substantial
lessening of competition on balance, arguing the latter. Rogers,
The Limited Case for An Efficiency Defense in Horizontal Mergers,
58 Tul. L. Rev. 503, 507-110 (1983).
5. Bok, Section 7 of The Clayton Act and The Merging of Law and
Economics, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 237 (1960) (pointing to the
paucity of remarks concerning the specifics of how the act was to
be applied)
.
6. Ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982)).
56
7. Ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1982)).
8. The legislative history of the 1914 Clayton Act and of the 1950
Celler-Kefauver Amendment will be jointly taking into account in
the following analysis.
9. H.R. REP. NO. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949); S. REP. NO.
1775, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1950).
10. See e.g. 96 CONG. REC . 16452 (1950) (remarks of Sen. Kefauver)
(most elaborate on the particular view). See also i^. at 16503-04
(statement of Sen. Aiken); i.d. at 16446 (remarks of Sen. O'Mahoney)
Concerning the political ramifications of high levels of concen-
tration see additionally the remarks of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt made in a message to the Congress entitled: Message
From President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Congress Transmitting
Recommendations Relative to the Strengthening and Enforcement of
Antitrust Laws: April 29, 1938. I.D. reprinted in Kintner, 4
The Legislative History of the Federal Antitrust Laws and Related
Statutes 3404-06.
For similar concerns expressed in the legislative history of
the 1914 Clayton Act, see e.g., 51 CONG. REC. 9086 (1914) (remarks
of Rep. Kelly); i.d. at 9167 (remarks of Rep. Nelson).
11. Acknowledging the congressional concern for political values:
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1051, 1060-65 (1979); Bok, supra note 5, at 235.
12. 95 CONG. REC. 11486 (1949) (statement of Rep. Celler)
.
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13. 96 CONG. REC. 11495 (remarks of Rep. Bryson) ; this concern was
also pointed out by the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v.
United States 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1963).
14. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp. 410 U.S. 526, 541-42
(1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in part).
15. 95 CONG. REC. 11486 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Celler)
.
16. Stressing the economical part: Sullivan, The New Merger Guidelines:
An Afterword, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 632, 636 (1983); mostly referring
to the "populist" issue involved: Pitofsky, supra note 13, at
1056.
17. 95 CONG. REC. 11506 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Bennett).
18. The freedom of opportunity was a major theme in the legislative
history of the 1914 Clayton Act: 51 CONG. REC. 15867 (1914)
(remarks of Sen. Reed); i.d. at 9197 (1914) (remarks of Rep.
Taggart).
19. 95 CONG. REC. 11506 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Byrne); see also i.d.
at 11722 (remarks of Rep. Carroll).
20. Id. at 11506 (remarks of Rep. Bennett).
21. Fox states: "While Congress expected all of the people to get the
political benefits of a decentralized economic system, in the
sense that decentralization would tend to stave off fascism,
socialism and communism, Congress preferred exploited consumers
to exploiting producers and it preferred profit opportunities for
'new men, new energies, and a new spirit of initiative' to profit
opportunities for entrenched persons or firms with power of
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leverage. Fox, The 1982 Merger Guidelines: When Economists Are
Kings? 71 Cal. L. Rev. 281, 295 n. 104 (1983). The implications
of the allocative efficiency model will have to be explored
further in respect to the validity cf Oliver Williamson's market
power/efficiency theory for merger analysis. At this point Fox's
remarks should be modified in so far as Congress most probably
would have welcomed the achievement of allocative efficiency as
the by-product of the competitive process. In an earlier article
Fox develops this concept of efficiency which is in accord with
the legislative history and precedent: "An environment which is
conducive to vigorous rivalry" would also enhance efficiency and
progressiveness . Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New
Equilibrium, 66 Cornell L. REV. 1140, 1169 (1981); see also id.
at 1154.
23. Opponents of the bill lamented a major threat to the efficiency
of both large and small firms: See e.g., 95 CONG. REC. 11487
(1949) (remarks of Rep. Goodwin).
24. 95 CONG. REC. 11486 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Celler) ; i.d. at
11493 (remarks of Rep. Carroll) (stating that free competition
"safeguards . . . the development of new types of business and
industry"); id. at 11723 (1949) (remarks of Rep. Yates) (stating
that in a concentrated market "big concerns will adopt a live-and-
let-live policy towards each other at the sacrifice of their
efficiency and their progress")
.
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25. Ponsoldt, The Expansion of Korizontal Merger Defenses After
General Dynamics: A Suggested Reconsideration of Sherman Act
Principles, 12 Loy. U. CHI. L.Y. 361, 398 (1981) (calling the
efficiency defense a "section seven anomaly"); Bok, supra note 6,
at 318; see also i.d. at 307; Lande, supra note 24, at 134;
Fisher-Lande, supra note 24, at 1592; Pitofsky, supra note 13, at
1064. Lande, however, states that Congress was not willing to
forego large and certain efficiency gains if the risk of a
substantial market power gain would only be slight. I.d. at 135.
Bok suggests that "perhaps more explicit guidance should be
demanded from Congress before adopting an interpretation which
could block really important increases in efficiency." He,
neverthelers , does not believe in a substantial likelihood of
efficiencies generated by mergers and stresses the alternative
avenue of internal expansion open to companies. I.d. at 318,
319.
26. Areeda & Turner, 4 Antitrust Law § 941b, § 903, 904 (1980)
advocating a limited role of non-economic values in the legislative
history)
.
27. Muris, The Efficiency Defense under Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
30 Case Western Reserve Law Review 381, 402 (1980).
28. Lande offers a comprehensive criticism of Muris's analysis.
Lande, supra note 24, at 132, 133.
29. S. DOC. NO. 35, 77th Cong. 1st Sess. (1941) and S. 577 and H.R.
1517, 78th Cong. 1st Sess. (1943).
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30. FTC, REPORT ON THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A SUM^IARY REPORT, 1948
reprinted in A Kintner, supra note 12, at 3436.
31. Bok points out the difficulty of drawing conclusions out of the
prior history of unsuccessful bills. Bok, supra note 6, at 251.
See also Lande , supra note 24, at 132.
32. See e.g. 95 CONG. REC. 11488 (1949) (statement of Rep. Celler)
;
H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. 6-7 (1949).
33. But suggested by Areeda & Turner and Muris. 4 Areeda & Turner,
supra note § 904, at 12-13; Muris, supra note 30, at 399.
34. Lande, supra note 24, at 132.
35. In a section 1 Sherman Act case brought before the enactment of
section 7 Clayton in 1911 the Court disregarded the issue of
efficiencies. (United States v. U.S. Steel Corp. 251 U.S. 417,
443, 444 (1919)). The defendant corporation (United Steel
Corporation), formed by the merging of about 180 separate firms,
had contended that there was a "necessity for integration, and
rescue from the old conditions from their improvidence and waste
of effort; and that, in redress of the conditions, the corporation
was formed, its purpose and effect being salvage not monopoly."
Miller mentions this decision in discussing the new 1984 Merger
Guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice. Miller, Notes on
the 1984 Merger Guidelines: Clarification of the policy or
repeal of the Celler-Kefauver Act?, 29 Ant. Bull. 653, 659
(1984).
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36. I hereby refer to the 1984 Guidelines of the U.S. Department of
Justice giving broad recognition to efficiency justifications in
merger control. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER
GUIDELINES, 35-36, A2, 50 (1984). Subsequent chapters of this
thesis will extensively discuss different aspects of this approach
by the Reagan-Administration. This government now wants to
codify its views on the role of efficiency considerations in
merger control policy, as can be seen in the proposed ball of
February 19, 1986, entitled "MERGER MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1986" S.
2160, H.R. A247 p. 3.
37. Expression taken from Sullivan, The New Merger Guidelines: An
Afterword, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 632, 634, 647 (1983).
38. Brovnn Shoe Co. v. United States 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
39. _Id. , at 344; see also the district court's finding which were
more explicit on the question of merger-generated efficiencies:
"Company-owned and company-controlled retail stores have definite
advantages in advertising, insurance. Inventory control and price
control. These advantages result in lower prices or in higher
quality for the same price. ..." United States v. Brown Shoe
Co., 179 F.Supp. 721, 738 (E.D. Mo. 1959).
40. Id., supra note 38, at 344.
41. See I.(2)(a).
42. Id., at 344. .
43. Brown had not advanced an efficiency defense. In contrary, it
denied that any advantages accrued from the merger see e.g. Brief
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for Petitioner at HI, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States 370 U.S.
294 (1962).
44. Muris, supra note 27, at 407; Areeda-Turner , supra note 26, at §
941b and § 104 at 11.
45. Areeda & Turner, id., at 104 at 11.
46. See Fox, Book Review, 54 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 446, 456 (1979).
47. United States v. Philadelphia National Bank 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
48. Id., at 371.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. The appellees had offered testimony at trial that the merger
would enable certain economies of scale but the Court considered
this attempted justification to be abandoned, since it was not
mentioned by the District Court and the defendant bank did not
pursue it on appeal. I.d. at 334-35 n. 10.
52. See Muris, supra note 27, at 409. But see Ford Motor co. v.
United States 405 U.S. 562, 569-70 (1972) (the court, rejecting
the argument that the acquisition by Ford made the acquired
company (Autolite) a more effective competitor, referred to the
Philadelphia bank-case thereby implying that this decision
precluded an efficiency defense); 4 Kintner, Federal Antitrust
Law § 34.13 at 181 and § 35.27 at 233 (1984) (referring to
Philadelphia Bank as precluding an efficiencies defense).
53. Federal Trade Commission v. Procter & Gamble Co. 386 U.S. 568
(1967).
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54. Id., at 580 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note
38, at 344).
55. Id., at 579.
56. Justice Harlan, concurring in this case, viewed cost savings as a
merger justification: "Countervailing economies reasonably
probable" should be weighed against adverse effects (i.d., at
599). Procter had, however, not shown any true efficiencies in
advertising: "Procter has merely shown that it is able to command
equivalent resources at a lower dollar cost than other bleach
producers. No peculiarly efficient marketing techniques have
been demonstrated, nor does the record show that a smaller net
advertising expenditure could be expected." (id!., at 604).
57. Areeda & Turner, supra note 26, § 941b at 153, § 104 at 12;
Muris, supra note 27, at 412.
58. Areeda & Turner, id., § 941b, at 154; Muris, id., at 412.
59. See Fisher & Lande, supra note 22, at 1595.
60. Muris, supra note 27, at 41„..
61. See Fox, supra note 46, at 457 (thereby striking down the criticisms
that the Court's language relies on Brown Shoe, which Areeda &
Turner—erroneously—find self-contradictory and that in Proctor
& Gamble true economies may have not been involved)
.
62. Construing the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 7
Clayton Act in the same manner: see e.g. Sullivan, Antitrust
Law, 630, 631 (1978); 4 Kintner, supra note 52, § 34.13 of 181;
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ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 166, 167 (2d
ed. 1984).
63. See Immenga Mestmacker, GWB-Koiranentar zuiii Kartellgesetz , Einleitunj
Nr. 30 (Munchen ]981).
64. Second Amendment to the Law Against Restraints of Competition of
August 4, 1973, [1973] BGBl. I. 917. The Law against Restraints
of Competition (GWB) was enacted on July 27, 1957 and became
effective on January 1, 1958. [1957] BGBl. I. 1081.
65. E.g. KONZENTRATIONSENQUETE, BTDrs IV 12320 (1964); Bericht des
Bundeskartellamtes ueber seine Taetigkeit im Jahre 1968 [Federal
Cartel Office, Annual Report, 1968] BTDrs. V 14236 (1969).
66. Verhandl. d. 6. Dt. Bundestages, 5. Sitzung, Sten. Bericht
28.10.1969, S. 23B [Congressional Record of the Lower House of
the 6th Federal German Parliament].
67. Entwurf eines Zweiten Gesetzes zur Aenderung des GWB, [Draft of
the Second Antitrust Law Reform Act of 1973], BTDrs. VI 12520
(1971). The identical draft was reintroduced to parliament after
the reelection of the SPD-FDP coalition in November 1972, BTDrs.
7/76 p. 16 (1973).
68. However, the legal criteria for examining the effect of the
merger on competition (sect. 22 and 24(1)) do not directly refer
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C. Theories Underlying Tradeoff Considerations Between Competition
and Efficiency
I
.
Introduction
Part C of this thesis undertakes the task of examining the
explanations provided by economic theories for an affirmative consideration
of efficiencies in merger analysis. From a legal standpoint it will
consider the utility of the following economic models as a guide for
assessing the role of efficiencies for the legal analysis under a
merger control law.
II. Williamson's Tradeoff Theorv
A tradeoff analysis by Oliver Williamson based on neoclassical
price theory is most often referred to as the theoretical explanation
for an affirmative consideration of efficiencies in merger analysis.
Some authors advocate that the Williamson's analysis should form the
2basis of a case-by-case efficiencies defense. Others believe that
his findings should be implicitly Incorporated into merger analysis
3
when fashioning general rules for determining when to prohibit mergers.
The different methods for considering the social desirability of
efficiencies in merger analysis will be explored in Part D.
1 . Williamson's Tradeoff Model
In order to understand Williamson's analysis, it might be helpful
to determine its place in welfare economics. As already mentioned
above, many economic theorists measure artificial output restraints
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within given markets in order to assess the allocative inefficiency
loss caused by private acts. This output-restriction approach, in
other words, determines whether challenged activity is likely to lead
to restriction of output and thereby to misallocation of resources.
That constitutes the first step in examining the net allocative-
efficiency effect of a merger.
The second step is put forth in Williamson's tradeoff analysis,
which stresses the importance of another factor to be considered in
this context: The cost savings resulting from the merger. Williamson
suggests that a relatively large gain in the merging parties' market
power would be more than offset by a relatively small efficiency gain
generated by the merger, i.e. a merger producing "nontrivial" economies
— as little as It — would generally yield a "net allocative-ef f iciency
gain" to society.
This argument can best be illustrated by Williamson's graph (see
the figure below) which compares the deadweight loss (the units of
output for which the consumers would be willing to pay at least the
cost of production) to the cost savings resulting from a merger.
*»•
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The graph assumes that before the merger a firm had costs equal to
line AC, but after the merger those costs were reduced to AC„. At
the same time, however, the increased market power created by the
merger results in a reduction of output from Q. to Q„. The efficiency
gains produced by this merger are represented by the shaded rectangle
A_, while the deadweight loss produced by the increased market power
of the post-merger firm is represented by the shaded triangle A. . If
A^, the cost savings, is larger than A
,
the deadweight loss, the
merger produces a net allocative efficiency gain (a net social gain
from the perspective of an economist or the legal scholar viewing the
maximization of allocative efficiency as the sole goal of antitrust)
.
In many instances the area A„ will be larger than the area A , since
the efficiency gains are distributed over every unit of production
that the post-merger firm sells. The deadweight loss, however,
applies only to the amount of output restricted. As Hovenkamp
exemplifies: "If the post-merger firm reduced its output by 10%, each
of the 90% of units still being produced would contribute to the
efficiency gain; the deadweight loss, however, would accrue over only
10% reduction."^
Williamson calculates the relative magnitudes of the price
increases and cost savings necessary for the merger to be beneficial,
9given a certain elasticity of demand. He concludes that "a relatively
modest cost reduction is sufficient to offset relatively larger price
increases even if the elasticity of demand is as high as 2." For
example, a merger that produced economies of 1.21% would have a net
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social gain, if it resulted in a price increase of 10% and the elasticity
of demand were 2.
2. Critique
Williamson's theory is vulnerable to criticism on several grounds.
The points of critique mentioned in this chapter were mainly selected
under two criteria:
First, it shall be demonstrated that economic theory provides for
different approaches towards a market power/efficiencies tradeoff
situation. Thus, the sole reliance on one specific analysis when
fashioning rules in merger control law has a shaky foundation in
economic theory.
Second, in the course of questioning the utility of Williamson's
model as a guide for merger control law, certain factors will be
mentioned which have to be considered when assessing the appropriate
role of efficiencies in merger analysis. Therefore, the results of
the subsequent discussion will predetermine the parameters of the
proposed public-interest exemption in Part E of this thesis.
Subchapters a to c will show that Williamson's model, because of
its sole focus on allocative efficiency effects, understates the
social loss caused by anticompetitive mergers. It also fails to take
into consideration the desirable impact of internal growth on the
level of competitive activity in a market, as will be explained in
subchapter d. Subchapter e demonstrates that Williamson disregards
malignant effects of efficiencies. The implications of the theory of
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"second best" in regard to Williamson's model will conclude the
examination.
a. Rent-Seeking Behavior
The only social cost of monopoly that Williamson's model recognizes,
is the loss in value resulting from substitution against the monopolized
product (represented by the area A^ ) ; i.e. the social cost incurred by
forcing some consumers to forego the transaction that was their first
choice (producing the largest social benefit) and to take their second
choice (producing a smaller social benefit)
.
According to the theory of "monopoly rent transformation,"
however, the social costs of monopoly are much higher. As Posner
points out, Williamson's analysis is "incomplete" since "[t]he expected
profits of the merger will generate an equivalent amount of costs as
the firms vie to make such mergers, or, after they are made, to
engross the profits generated by the higher post-merger price through
. . V ..12service competition or whatever.
Thus, the social loss of monopoly does not only consist of the
deadweight loss caused by monopoly pricing (i.e., the pricing in
excess of marginal cost by a seller with market power) . Additionally
the deadweight loss caused by monopoly conduct must be taken into
account (i.e., the conduct undertaken to acquire or preserve monopoly
13
power has to be taken into account) . This so-called rent-seeking
behavior may be socially beneficial (e.g. research and development) as
well as socially inefficient (e.g. predatory pricing, false advertising
14
etc.). To the extent that the monopoly profit is spent in socially
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detrimental ways the rectangle W is a pure deadweight loss to society.
Consequently not only the area A, but also the area W has to be taken
into account in tradeoff calculations.
The theory of monopoly rent transformation has been criticized en
several grounds. For two reasons this debate does rot have to be
pursued further. First, the area W has to be included in tradeoff
calculations also for other reasons mentioned later on. Second, it is
sufficient to note that economic theory provides for different approaches
for dealing with the tradeoff situation.
The sole reliance on Williamson's theory when fashioning rules in
merger law has a shaky foundation in economic theory.
b. The X-Inef f iciency Factor
One of the major flaws of any merger control policy based solely
on the Williamson tradeoff analysis is its neglect for the fact that
mergers can not only positively but also negatively affect productive
efficiency. While Williamson's theory focuses exclusively on the
allocative efficiency loss resulting from excessive market power,
economists have proven that there is another kind of loss associated
with undue concentration which should be a concern of merger analysis.
A social loss resulting from market power not accounted for by
Williamson's tradeoff model is the x-inefficiency factor. The theory
of x-inefficiency (developed by Harvey Leibenstein ) refers to the
productive inefficiencies which may result when firms are shielded
from hard competition.
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In contrast to the Chicago School of Economics which assumes that
1 8
firms are always cost minimizers this school of thought distinguishes
between perfectly competitive and more concentrated markets. VJhen
competitive pressures in a market are low (due to a high degree of
concentration) and firms receive high profits, management will have
19less incentive to minimize costs and may allow some slack in operations.
This is due to the fact that once price is above the competitive level
and a firm obtains excessive profits, management can afford a certain
amount of waste (above minimum cost) and still make a comfortable
20
profit. This is different when competitive pressures in a market
are high (with the extreme of a perfectly competitive market) and the
firms only earn normal returns. Then management is not able to afford
21
"organizational slack" and must search for ways to reduce costs.
Otherwise their firm faces extinction. The cost inefficiency, due to
slackness in management incurred in situations where competitive
pressures are low, is the x-inef f iciency
.
The theory of x-inef ficiency demonstrates that a hi£;her degree of
competitive activity yields cost-efficiency. This contention is
22
overwhelmingly supported by empirical evidence. The contrast to the
Chicago School beliefs the theory of x-inef f iciency suggests that
preserving competition as process is a superior route to the attainment
of lower-cost production than relying on business autonomy. The
assumption that business behavior is always efficient is simply not
justified. In the plastic language of Sullivan: "... rivalry in a
market may squeeze out slack even when firms are already using advanced
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technology and earning no excessive returns. In real markets cost
functions go up or down over time. Rivalry tends to force them
?3
down.
""
Williamson's analysis only examines allocative inefficiency as a
result of market power. It ignores the x-inef f ieciency loss to
society. However, when assessing the role of efficiencies in merger
analysis, the x-inef ficiency factor must be considered. Thus output-
restriction theory (on which Williamson's analysis is based) is unable
to give an appropriate measurement of a merger's efficiency-yielding
potential.
c. Disregard for Distributive Consequences of Market Power
Special regard has to be given to the distributive consequences
of a merger leading to market power but also resulting in productive
efficiency gains: Who profits from the merger and who loses, the
producers or the consumers? One should distinguish between the area
A„ and the area A in Williamson's graph:
aa. Monopoly Profits and Higher Prices
24 25
As Lande and Hovenkamp point out the cost savings (area A„) d
i r e c t 1 y accrue to the post-merger firm in the form of higher
profits. The output, on the other hand, is restricted (Q^) and the
consumers now have to pay the higher post-merger price (P^) . So how
can Bork come to the conclusion that a merger leading to both more
market power and productive efficiency gains "represents a net gain to
all consumers?" When and how are the cost-savings passed on to the
consumer?
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The cost savings might reach the consumers indirectly.
Fewer resources are needed to make the product, and these resources
are available ("freed") for other uses, thus, society could benefit as
a whole. But, as Lande points in this context, "it is not possible to
be sure that all or even most of the A„ benefits will be passed on to
consumers of the product in question or even to similarly situated
27
consumers." Additionally, one should bear in mind that the savings
in resources still mean higher prices for the consumers of the restricted
product. From the perspective of the economist, the net allocative
efficiency gain of such a merger may be welcomed and regarded as
socially beneficial. The consumer, however, paying more than the
competitive price, might not share this view.
Additionally, the efficiency gains might directly accrue to the
consumer in the form of lower prices. Some authors have attempted to
measure the amount of a merger's cost savings necessary to permit the
28
price to remain constant or fall, despite any increased market power.
The critique of such an approach in chapter II will nevertheless
demonstrate that one can not rely on these computations.
As a rule it shall therefore be presumed that the direct effect
of the merger is to give the cost savings (area A ) to the post-merger
29firm in the form of higher profits. The producer pockets the
efficiency gains and the consumer has to pay a higher post-merger
price
.
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bb. Consideration of Wealth Transfers
Williamson's analysis completely disregards this income effect,
which constitutes a wealth transfer from the consumers, who pay higher
prices, to the firms gaining increased market power. Instead, the
Williamson welfare model analyses solely the merger effects in terms
of maximizing allocative efficiency (i.e. determining the rate of
output that maximizes the total wealtii of society) without taking
account of whether consumer prices increase or decrease. As Williamson
states, "[t]his transformation of benefits from one form (consumers'
30
surplus) to another (profit) [i.e. the wealth transfer] is treated
31
as a wash under the conventional welfare economies model." Several
legal scholars defining "competition" in the terms of allocative
efficiency agree with this procedure and disregard income distribution
32
when analyzing the market-power/efficiencies tradeoff.
It has been shown that the wealth transfer effects (represented
by the area A^) dominate the allocative inefficiency effects in most
33
cases, (i.e. the area A„ is much larger than area A^ minus area A ).
Thus, any consideration of wealth transfers would significantly
34influence the results of tradeoff calculations. A much larger
efficiency gain — than Williamson suggests — would be necessary to
35
offset a gain in the merging parties' market power.
As already mentioned in this thesis, Congress wanted to protect
consumers from unfair transfers of wealth from buyers to sellers. The
legislators were not indifferent, as is the economist Williamson, to
who benefits from the increase in efficiency.
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If — de lege ferenda — an efficiency justification should be
introduced into U. S. -American merger control law, the distributive
consequences of market power would also most certainly be considered.
It is difficult to imagine that Congress would not believe that
consumers are entitled to products priced at competitive levels and
should be protected from paying artificially high prices. Unlike some
economists, and legal scholars, legislators would not be indifferent
as to who would benefit from the increase in efficiencies generated by
a merger.
Since Williamson's tradeoff analysis disregards the redistribut ive
effects of market power it does not provide a sufficient basis on
which to conduct present or future antitrust policy.
d . Internal Growth and Other Alternatives to the Specific
Merger
Logic suggests that any properly informed merger policy must take
into account that businesses can often attain desired efficiencies
through more salutory means than the planned merger, e.g. internal
expansion, de novo market entry, joint venture or another less competitive
restraining merger. If these alternative routes were likely to occur
but would not lead to an increase in market power, no tradeoff between
the preservation of a competitive process and the attainment of
efficiency gains would occur.
Williamson's basic tradeoff model does not take this point into
consideration. However, in so far as the realization of economies
through internal expansion is concerned, the author suggests a
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37qualification to his basic analysis: In a growing market, economies
would eventually be realized through internal growth if not by merger.
An appropriate economic examination would therefore have to determine
if the immediate net allocative efficiency gain of a merger (leading
to cost savings exceeding the deadweight loss) is outweighed by the
possible achievement of the same cost savings — over time — by
internal expansion not resulting in an increase in market power. In
other words, the timing of the stream of benefits and costs would have
38
to be assessed. Nevertheless, Williamson and legal scholars (e.g.
39 40
Bork, Muris ) , utilizing his model as a basis for their merger
analysis, are very cautious in applying this qualifying principle.
They express great concern over the fact that internal growth may
increase costs for business and thereby might even prevent the achieve-
ment of certain efficiencies. Since these authors equate business
efficiency with net social gains, they contend that society might
suffer a loss if external expansion were prohibited. Thus, expansion
through merger is presumed to be a socially preferable route to
41internal growth.
None of the above mentioned authors mentions why internal expansion
42
has been viewed as socially preferable under existing law. Internal
growth, unlike mergers, increases total industry capacity. The
expanded output through internal expansion must win its way in the
marketplace by luring customers from competitors. This increases the
43 44
level of competitive activity in the industry. The pursuit of
allocative efficiency as a single of antitrust law ignores this
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positive impact of internal expansion on the competitive process of an
industry. However, any economically rational merger policy must pay
due regard to the enhancement of competition through internal growth.
A prime concern to society is the preservation of an environment
conducive to rivalry between firms, not merely the well-being and
efficiency of business.
Apart from the possibility of internal expansion, other forms of
external expansion must also be taken into account when assessing the
46desirability of efficiencies generated by a particular merger. For
example, a merger with a firm outside the inefficient firm's market,
producing a related product (i.e. a conglomerate merger) may provide
the same opportunity for achieving economies as the challenged horizontal
merger. On the other hand a conglomerate merger may cause less
restraints to competition than a horizontal merger leading to the
immediate loss of a competitor. Another equally efficient but less
competitively restrictive alternative may be a joint venture, where a
firm is of efficient size but too small for efficient production of a
supply component, distribution or any other specific function.
All the above mentioned alternatives to a specific merger are
competitively preferable. Still they may result in the same amount of
cost savings. These considerations must be part of an analysis
assessing the social desirability of the efficiency-yielding potential
47
of an individual merger. Williamson's model only examines the
effect of a merger on allocative efficiency thereby failing to acknowledge
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the desirable impact of internal growth on the level of competitive
activity in an industry.
e . Malignant Effects of Efficiencies
Williamson's tradeoff analysis presumes that the cost savings
generated by a merger also leading to an increase in market power are
always proconsumer and socially beneficial. Of course this approach
runs counter to the West German and American laws' treatment of
efficiencies in merger analysis stressing the socially undesirable,
anticompetitive effect of efficiencies leading to comparative competitive
advantages of firms thereby deteriorating the structure of markets
(see Part B) . However, it is unnecessary to point to the laws' theory
of efficiencies to illustrate that Williamson's presumption is unwarranted.
This is already illuminated by the following two arguments:
First, one has to distinguish between cost savings conferring
real resource savings (so called: "real" economies) and those representing
48
private pecuniary savings (so called: "pecuniary" economies).
Put in economic terms, "real" economies permit more or better
output for the same expenditure on input or the same output for a
49lesser expenditure on inputs.
For example, larger plants may facilitate increased specialization
of labor and machinery. Consequently, the amount of labor and materials
needed to produce a unit of output can be reduced; in other words, the
unit costs of large machines can be spread over a larger output or
longer product run leading to a reduction of these costs. In such
cases fewer resources are needed in order to get "society's work"
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done: The allocation of resources in the economy is improved. This
can be regarded as socially desirable. (Again, it has to be stressed
that such a conclusion based solely on welfare economics does not
predetermine the legal assessment of efficiencies in the context of a
competitive-effects analysis. Thus, real efficiencies can have market
power-enhancing effects if they result in increases of barriers to
entry or competitive advantages, which may serve to entrench the
position of an enterprise in a market. This has been elaborated on in
Part B.)
Large size may also lead to monetary savings of a firm with no
social benefits whatsoever. This is particularly obvious when large
firms can obtain supplies at lower prices than their smaller rivals
because of greater bargaining power (so-called: monopsony power).
Here, income is transferred from the supplier to the purchaser without
any resource saving. The same applies to advertising economies
resulting from size, such as a media discounts if such discounts
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merely reflect customer or advertiser bargaining leverage. In such
a case an unfair advantage which is unrelated to superior efficiency
is conferred on the large advertiser in respect to his smaller rivals.
These private pecuniary savings are clearly socially undesirable
and can not serve as a justification for otherwise anticompetitive
mergers. Any tradeoff analysis must pay tribute to the distinction
between "real" and "pecuniary" savings.
Second, Williamson's model focuses solely on the welfare consequences
.of a merger and disregards its effects from the structure of the
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relevant market. A series of mergers resulting in cost savings but
also in market power gains can severely diminish the workability of
competition in the market. A higher level of concentration will
enable firms to collude successfully. Prices will rise even further
(since Williamson's analysis already assumes a price increase). This
danger was the reason why Congress wrote the incipiency-standard into
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section 7 Clayton Act: Already the reasonable probability of
long-term detrimental effects for the market structure were to be
prevented.
The utility of a merger policy based on Williamson's analysis is
diminished by its failure to acknowledge structural effects of mergers.
(The same applies to any other theory solely applying welfare economics.)
f . "Second-Best" Considerations
Like any other neoclassical, partial equilibrium analysis,
Williamson's model can be challenged on "second best" grounds. The
implications of the "second best" theory have been extensively discussed
by economists and legal scholars. Therefore this point shall only
briefly be entertained. However, any comprehensive criticism of a
microeconomic theory, purporting to serve as a guide for antitrust
policy, cannot do without a consideration of the problem of "second
best."
In a few words, the theory of "second best" is based on the
premise that real world markets never meet all the conditions of
perfect competition. On the contrary, monopolies and cartels, as well
90
as other market imperfections (due to the absence of information,
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government regulation and other phenomena) exist.
In view of these market imperfections, the theory states that the
improvement of competition in one market will not necessarily result
in allocative efficiency in the entire system. As Fox exemplifies:
"... conversion of pricing in one market from monopoly pricing to
competitive pricing does not improve resource allocation if resources
are drawn from another monopoly or a limited monopoly market. Resources
would then be dravm from a market in which output is already too low,
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causing output in the market of deflected demand to be even lower."
Therefore "the problem of second best connotes the circumstance that
an apparently second best solution may be no solution at all."
Williamson's welfare model is vulnerable to "second best" consid-
erations because it isolates one sector from the rest of the economy
thereby failing to examine interactions between sectors. Ergo, as
Williamson himself states, "certain effects may go undetected, and
occasionally behavior which appears to yield net economic benefits in
a partial equilibrium analysis will result in net losses when investi-
gated in a general equilibrium context."
What should be concluded from the theory of "second best" in
regard to Williamson's model? Some authors assert that the incorporation
of "second best" factors into a particular antitrust analysis causes
insuperable burdens and is unworkable. Bork, therefore, wants to
"simply forget the topic of second best."
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However, Williair.son' s model is a standard microeconomic analysis
designed to measure the point where business behavior maximizes
economic efficiency. The theory of "second best" illustrates clearly
that the model's task cannot be achieved; i.e. even if the deadweight
loss of monopoly can be offset by decreases in resource output in one
specific market, this does not necessarily lead to an overall improve-
ment of allocative efficiency in the national economy.
Nevertheless, the (microeconomic) measurement of output restriction
in general and Williamson's assessment of the possible tradeoff
between allocative efficiency losses and productive efficiency gains
in particular are not rendered useless by "second best" considerations.
As pointed out by legal scholars, output restriction analysis can be a
helpful tool in identifying the behavior likely to restrain trade and
64describing the point where monopoly prices and profits are reached.
Williamson's analysis at least, allows us to gain insight into the
relationship between productive and allocative efficiency in a particular
market
.
Still, the utility of Williamson's tradeoff methodology as a
guide for incorporating efficiency considerations into the legal
analysis of mergers is severely diminished by the theory of "second
best."
III. An Adjustment Alternative
Several economists and the enforcement agencies, urging the
implementation of efficiency justifications in merger enforcement,
have realized that Williamson's analysis can not properly inform a
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rational merger policy. Therefore efforts have been made to create a
different theoretical basis for the affirmative consideration of
efficiencies in merger analysis.
Williamson's disregard for the distributive consequences of an
efficiency-yielding merger also leading to market power is often
lamented. It is crucial for antitrust policy to consider whether
consumer prices increase or decrease. Supra-competitive pricing can
not be justified on the grounds that producers pocket efficiency gains
(see chapter I.e.). Therefore, both enforcement agencies, the
Reagan-Administration's proposed Merger Modernization Act of 1986
and other commentators only want to permit an efficiency justification
if the merger will not result in higher prices to the consumer.
Thus, the passing-on of the efficiency gains in the form of lower
prices or better quality products is seen as beneficial, not the
net-allocative efficiency gain of the merger. But how can a merger
leading to a market-power gain make a decrease in prices possible or
prevent an increase in prices if the definition of market power
requires a firm to be able to maintain prices above competitive levels
for a significant period of time? The competitive process has been
weakened or eliminated and can not serve as a safeguard for competitive
prices any more. The only possibility is that the simultaneously
achieved cost saving assert a downward pressure on the price.
The theoretical basis for the above mentioned proposals can be
found in an adjusted version of Williamson's tradeoff analysis also
taking account of wealth transfers. Again, neoclassical price theory
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is applied to explain how efficiency can be achieved. Both enforcement
agencies as well as the other authorities mentioned above adhere to
CO
the following reasoning: A lower (marginal) cost base of a merged
firm with market power will lead to a lower profit-maximizing price
since the marginal cost curve would meet the marginal revenue curve at
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a level of output greater than that prior to the cost reduction.
Some authors have attempted to measure the amount of merger's
cost savings necessary to permit the price to remain constant or fall,
despite any increased market power. These computations lead to the
conclusion that a merger would have to produce impossibly large
efficiencies to permit the same or lower prices from monopoly than
from a pre-merger competitive situation. However, under the assumption
that a merger would move an industry from one level of oligopoly to
another, higher level, a merger that increased market power could lead
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to lower consumer prices with much smaller efficiencies. The
results of these price-theoretical measurements shall not be questioned
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here. Any application of these measurements to merger analysis
meets a similar criticism as Williamson's microeconomic analysis,
except that here wealth transfers are taken into consideration.
As the authors point out themselves, "[t]he precision in the
numbers, . .
.
, is purely theoretical and illustrative. In practice,
all the parameters in the equations are subject to imprecision and
7A
require estimation or informed guesses." The economic model can
only clarify, at what point the decrease of prices despite an increase
in market power become feasible for the post-merger firm. There is.
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however, no guarantee that the real-world firm once it achieves a
certain degree of market power (and is, thus, not subject to
competition any more) will in fact behave according to this model and
lower its prices. One should rather rely on the working of a
dynamic process of competition than on a microeconomic analysis as a
safeguard for lower prices and other consumers' benefits.
Furthermore, the adjustment alternative does not pay due regard
to the x-inef f iciency factor (see chapter I.b.). It does not acknowledge
the desirable impact of internal growth on the level of competitive
activity in an industry (see chapter I.d.). Moreover, it does not
take malignant effects of efficiencies into consideration (see chapter
I.e.).
Still, this theoretical approach is a laudible attempt to accommodate
the concern for wealth transfers in an efficiency justification and
therefore change the narrow focus of Williamson's model on a merger's
allocative efficiency effect. It thereby acknowledges that the
efficiency-yielding potential of a merger leading to market power is
not per se good. Society does not only value efficiencies because
they result in business efficiency. The adjustment alternative
represents an interesting way of adapting an economic analysis to the
legal analysis of mergers.
Nevertheless, Williamson's analysis as well as its adjustment
alternative can not serve as a theoretical basis for the affirmative
consideration of efficiencies in merger analysis.
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IV. Conclusion: Parameters for Efficiency Considerations
The preceding discussion has once again shown that neoclassical
price theory does not provide a sufficient basis on which to conduct
merger policy. The two approaches outlined above are already
useless as guides for assessing the proper role of efficiencies in
merger policy because they do not represent sound economics. Conflicting
economic arguments compel a broader investigation in order to judge a
possible tradeoff between competition and efficiency in a case of
merger simultaneous!}' leading to market power and efficiency gains.
These additional — economic — considerations (Chapter Ila-b) , also
constitute parameters for efficiency justifications.
Moreover, economic models are completely unable to account for
non-economic concerns which any present (certainly the existing
U. S .-American and German law) or future merger law will be desiged to
address. Political and social concerns with a rising concentration,
the preservation and enlargement of business opportunities and the
distrust of power can not be computed in mathematical formula or
squeezed into a diagram. They must however be considered in tradeoff-
considerations between the long-run preservation of a competitive
process and the short-run attainment of efficiencies.
Part E will therefore argue that the proper theoretical basis for
assessing the role of efficiencies in merger policy remains the notion
of competition as process. Rivalrous interaction among a larger
number of firms in open markets will — in most cases — produce
productive and allocative efficiency as well as other beneficial
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results for consumers (such as lower prices). In addition, this
concept of efficiency pays due regard to non-economic concerns. In
limited cases it shall be proposed to account for efficiency concerns
in the context of a narrow public-interest exemption clause.
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D. Methods for an Affirmative Consideration of Efficiencies in
Merger Anaysis
This chapter will deal with the different methods of an affirmative
consideration of efficiencies in merger analysis. Basically two
approaches can be distinguished: A case-by-case efficiencies defense
and the implicit incorporation of efficiencies by raising the thresholds
for challenging mergers.
The subsequent discussion will focus mainly on the Department of
Justice's and Federal Trade Commission's stand on this issue.
Additionally, the treatment of efficiencies in the Reagan Administration's
Merger Modernization Act of 1986 will be scrutinized. The various
approaches of economists and legal scholars concerning the incorporation
of efficiencies into merger analysis will be directly addressed in the
text only as far as they are not congruent with the present government's
policy.
It should be also noted that this part will mainly address the
horizontal merger context. Qualifications as to the treatment of
efficiencies arising from vertical and conglomerate mergers will be
expressly mentioned.
Chapter I will briefly survey the methods to accommodate efficiency
concerns in merger analysis proposed by the Department of Justice, the
Federal Trade Commission and the Reagan-Administration's Merger
Modernization Act of 1986. Chapter II and III contain an in-depth
study of these approaches.
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I. Survey of Methods to Accommodate Efficiency Concerns in Merger
Analysis
The 1982 Merger Guidelines of the U. S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE advocated that efficiencies should be taken into
account implicitly while expressing hostility to a specific efficiencies
defense: Only in "extraordinary cases" and under tight preconditions
(which will be further elaborated on in Chapter III) would the Department
consider a claim of efficiencies as a mitigating factor when deciding
2
whether to challenge a merger. Rather, challenge thresholds should
be set high so that in the "overwhelming majority of cases, the
Guidelines will allow firms to achieve available efficiencies through
3 4
mergers without interference from the Department." Commentators
reasoned that the Guideline's preference for an implicit incorporation
of efficiencies stemmed from the realization of the extreme difficulties
involved in a case-by-case efficiencies defense (see chapter III)
.
Nevertheless, the Department's reluctance to consider efficiencies
on an individual basis was soon abandoned: Under the 1984 Guidelines
any efficiency gain in any case will be considered in determining
whether to challenge a merger. Efficiencies shall however not be
treated as a legally cognizable defense. In addition, the Division
retained the higher challenge thresholds of the 1982 Guidelines,
recognizing that these former guidelines had already given American
industries "increased freedom [...] to enhance efficiency through
..6
mergers
.
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The Justice Department had already previously announced its new
Merger Guidelines in June 1984. The efficiency argument played a
significant role in approving a restructured merger of LTV Corporation
and Republic Steel, the third and fourth largest American steel
companies. After first challenging the merger and finding "little or
Q
no basis for the claimed efficiencies," the Department ;.under pressure
9
of the Commerce Department ) nonetheless proceeded to file a consent
decree permitting the merger to go forward provided the new entity
divests two plants concluding that the merger "may recognize some
efficiencies." (This case will be further discussed in Chapter
III.)
A similar approach, combining the two methods of accommodating
efficiency considerations in guidelines, had already been advanced by
the Federal Trade Commission in its 1982
Statement Concerning Horizontal Mergers: Raising the market share
thresholds "so that economies of scale generally can be realized to
the fullest extent possible" in addition to allowing an efficiency
defense in individual cases so that "all possible efficiencies" can be
1 la
accounted for. The FTC Statement is more flexible regarding a
case-by-case analysis of efficiencies than the Department's 1982
Guidelines but less permissive than the 198A Guidelines in limiting
the defense to operating efficiencies such as production or plant
economies of scale. The Commission unofficially amended its 1982
Statement, which provides that efficiencies will be considered only as
.a policy matter, in an order challenging the acquisition of French
Ill
Hospital in San Louis Obispo, California by American Medical Inter-
national, Inc. (AMI), the third largest U.S. commercial hospital
lie
chain: Efficiencies should be considered as part of the legal
analysis under § 7 Clayton Act, i.e. should be treated as a legally
• 1,1 ^ f lidcognizable defense.
In its "Merger Modernization Act of 1986" the Reagan-Administration
proposes to liberalize the challenge thresholds of § 7 Clayton Act
lie
significantly. In this respect two changes will have the greatest
impact: First, deleting the incipiency standard of § 7 and inserting
a standard of "significant probability"; second, replacing the existing
"lessen competition" or "create a monopoly" language with a narrow
definition of market power. This reflects the Reagan-Administration's
belief that "mergers, in general, have important procompetitive and
efficiency-enhancing effects."
II. Implicit Incorporation of Efficiency Considerations
As one possible way of incorporating efficiencies into merger
analysis the Justice Department's Merger Guidelines, the 1982 FTC
Statement and the Reagan Administration's Merger Modernization Act of
1986 account for efficiency effects implicitly, by raising the thresholds
for challenging mergers. The subsequent discussion of such an approach
will mainly focus on the provisions of the Department's 1984 Merger
Guidelines, which contain the most explicit set of rules concerning
the competitive analysis of mergers.
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1. The Setting of Challenge Thresholds
The numerical (concentration) levels for challenging mergers
under the 1984 Guidelines are higher than those responded to under
13 14
existing case law and the 1968 Guidelines:
In evaluating horizontal mergers, the Department will consider
both the post-merger market concentration and the increase in concen-
tration resulting from the merger. The level of concentration is
1
6
measured by the use of the Herf indahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) . "" The
Guidelines group markets into three categories according to their
HHIs. In markets having an HHI below 1000 (characterized as
"unconcentrated") , the Department is "unlikely" to challenge mergers.
In markets with a post-merger HHI between 1000 and 18000 (characterized
as "moderately concentrated") , the Department is also unlikely to
challenge mergers producing an increase in the HHI of less than 100
points. If the increase exceeds 100 points, the Department will
consider other factors in determining whether to contest the merger.
In markets having an HHI above 1800 (highly concentrated), the Department
will challenge mergers if the increase in HHI exceeds 100 points, but
is unlikely to challenge mergers where the increase is less than 50
points.
Comparing the numerical standards of the new Merger Guidelines
with those of the 1968 Guidelines, some commentators find that only
19
slight changes have been made. Fox, however, points out that first,
both Guidelines draw a different line between highly concentrated and
.less highly concentrated markets. Ergo, a four-firm concentration of
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75%, which characterized a highly concentrated market under the 1968
Guidelines may fall into the less-than-highly concentrated category of
20
the new Merger Guidelines. Second, the new Guidelines allow HHI
increases that are substantially more lenient than those that would
21have been permitted under the former Guidelines.
The most significant departure from the 1968 Guidelines and
existing case law, however, is the new Guidelines' expansive mode of
22
market definition: A market is defined as "a group of products and
a geographic area such that a hypothetical firm that is the only
present and future seller of those products in the area would possess
market power — the power profitably to restrict output and to raise
23prices." Stated briefly, to define a market, an artificial price
rise is assumed and the probable responses by buyers and suppliers to
the hypothesized price increase are observed. The alternative products
to which the buyers would switch and the facilities that producers
would convert to the production of the relevant product, are included
24
in the market. Several commentators emphasize that Supreme Court
decisions traditionally focus on current (existing) trade patterns in
25
which the merging firms operate. Contrastingly, the Guidelines'
approach includes potential competition in the market; they ask for
the forms of trade patterns which would result from an artificial
price increase in a provisional market. This mode of analysis anticipating
competitive responses that might never occur, leads to broader market
definitions. Broader market definitions, in turn, will lead to the
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calculation of smaller market shares in this way market power may be
J 26understated.
Thus, the change of the numerical levels for challenging mergers
and the new mode of market definition has lead to a significantly
loosened merger enforcement. This increase in challenge thresholds
has been welcomed as the best way "to correct for efficiencies on
27
average"; i.e. to account for efficiency effects. Indeed, the
setting of thresholds under the 1984 Guidelines stems from the Department's
conviction that horizontal mergers are likely to yield efficiencies
28
and benefit the economy. Thus, American industries should be given
29
"increased freedom [...] to enhance efficiency through mergers." In
order not to interfere with the "efficiency-enhancing potential of
30
mergers", challenge thresholds were set high so that fewer mergers
would be challenged and — as argued — fewer efficiencies would be
1
31 32
lost.
In its "Merger Modernization Act of 1986" the Reagan-Administration
proposes to liberalize the challenge thresholds of § 7 Clayton Act
33
significantly, which has just been pointed out. This reflects the
Reagan-Administration's belief that "mergers, in general, have important
procompetitive and efficiency-enhancing effects."
2 . Critique
The implicit incorporation of efficiencies into merger analysis
by raising the thresholds of illegality, is based on a controversial
economic theory and is not supported by economic fact. Generalizations
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about the favorable net balance of efficiencies accruing from mergers
are nothing but educated guesses.
a) The new Merger Guidelines and the Merger Modernization Act — at
least partially — adopt the view of the Chicago School of industrial
economics that concentration reflects the most efficient means of
production. This "body of economic learning" (the so-called "new
37learning") which shall lead to a "modernization of merger analysis"
under § 7 Clayton Act is, however, highly controversial.
Economists differ substantially on the relationship between
39
concentration and firm profitability. Stated very briefly, the
"traditionalists" view, which was the consensus analysis until about
1970, held that increased market concentration typically implies
40
market power to elevate prices, in turn leading to higher profits.
Since 1970 the market power explanation for the concentration/profits
correlation has often been criticized. A "revisionist" view advocates
that market concentration is generally due to efficiency considerations,
41
not market power. Thus, it is argued, concentrated markets are
concentrated because a firm must have a sizeable market share to
realize all economics of scale and larger firms have higher profits
because they take full advantage of those scale economies and are
/ 9
therefore more efficient. The "traditionalist/revisionist" —
43
debate can certainly not be decided here. As Pautler concludes,
44
"neither side has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt." Both
market-power and efficiency effects as well as other causes contribute
45
to the overall relationship between concentration and profitability.
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In light of the continuing debate it seems highly dubious to base
the reformation of merger analysis under § 7 Clayton Act on the
controversial "new learning" of the Chicago School of economics,
b) A substantial increase of challenge thresholds in order to
account for efficiency effects on average is not supported by empirical
evidence
.
It has just been demonstrated that the new Merger Guidelines set
the threshold challenge levels in a way which seems to imply that
generalizations about the efficiency-creating potential of mergers at
certain concentration levels are possible. Thus, "mid-zone" mergers
(in markets with an HHI between 1000 and 1 800, roughly equally a
46
four-firm concentration ratio between 50% and 70%) are treated favorably.
The creation of such an "uncertainty-zone" where the Department
prefers to err on the side of nonintervention out of fear of interfering
with the abilities of firms to achieve efficiencies is, however, not
justified by empirical evidence: Several studies corroborate that
plant scale economies will as often as not require market shares of
47
10%. In a study of 12 industries, a group of economists found that
only one industry had economies of scale of a single plant that
48
required more than a 10% national market share.
Another study reveals that out of 23 industries only seven
required minimum optimal scales for a plant of at least 10 percent;
49
four, fifteen percent; two, twenty percent. In their textbook,
Areeda and Turner pay tribute to those studies and presume illegality
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of most "mid-zone" mergers with the need to consider the variety of
factors required by the Guidelines.
Thus, there is no empirical basis for assuming that "mid-zone"
mergers yield efficiencies in general. Therefore, there is no justi-
fication for allowing these mergers in order to ensure the most
efficiencies. Such a position merely represents a philosophical
belief.
Another argument which is again and again \oiced, calling for a
liberalization of the challenge thresholds in merger enforcement (as a
means to incorporate efficiency concerns implicitly) proceeds along
the following lines: The world has changed since 1950, when the
Clayton Act was last amended and strengthened by the Celler-Kefauver
Act. Today, United States industries are in a global economy and face
increasing competition from foreign firms. In such a different world
it takes larger firms in order to be internationally competitive.
Merger law should therefore not handicap American competitors in their
quest for efficiency.
The above mentioned critique of the Administration's belief that
higher concentration reflects the most efficient means of product was
mainly based on empirical evidence examining the market shares for
reaching the minimum optimal scale only in the domestic market.
However, it is generally not asserted that firms with larger market
54
shares are necessary in order to compete on an international level.
On the contrary, critics of the Reagan Administration's reform package
emphasize that weakening the law against anticompetitive mergers
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actually will make the United States less competitive internationally,
not more: The permanent increase in concentration would reduce competitive
pressures in the long run. Without the spur of competition large
firms would loose the incentive to innovate and to maintain efficiency
operations. Sen. Rodino points out that distressed domestic industries
(e.g. textiles, shoes, steel) facing the most severe competition
from abroad, "will be the least likely beneficiaries of alleged merger
efficiencies, since their operations are not significantly tied to
research and development and capital expenditures. If anything, more
combinations among these labor-intensive companies will only lead to
more plant closing and lay offs."
It may therefore be concluded that American firms do not need to
be large in order to produce and distribute their products abroad more
efficiently. To liberalize challenge thresholds on efficiency grounds
58
is contrary to fact. Such an attempt masquerades laissez-faire as
efficiency and sets back American business in the race to be the
best.
III. Case-by-Case Consideration of Efficiencies
Another way of incorporating efficiency considerations into
merger analysis is the measurement of probable cost savings from each
individual merger.
However, this chapter will demonstrate that such an approach
poses severe implementation problems which would render an antimerger
statute ineffective. Any form of efficiencies defense as part of a
competitive-effects test must therefore be rejected.
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The practical problems arising from the introduction of case-by-case
consideration of efficiencies in merger analysis are common to the
framing of rules in merger policy. Broadening the factual inquiry
in a merger proceeding and implementing complicated rules diminishes
the effectiveness of an antimerger statute.
Courts and enforcement agencies operate within the limitations of
time, expense and limited expertise. The more complex merger analysis
becomes, the less administrable it will be. Less cases would be
brought because enforcement resources are limited. Thus, more anti-
62
competitive mergers would go unchallenged.
Moreover, complex rules for assessing the competitive effect of
mergers based on extensive factual inquiry increase the uncertainty
about the legality of a specific merger. However, antimerger statutes
should be predictable. Businessmen have to be able to reasonably
determine the legality of an intended merger. Uncertainty might
provoke firms to try out merger deals which will later be challenged
by the enforcement agencies and courts leading to an unnecessary waste
of resources. On the other hand, firms might be deterred from, attempting
potentially desirable mergers.
1. Practical Impediments of an Efficiencies Defense
a) A complete efficiencies defense would require the balancing of
the potential for inefficiency created by the increased market power
of the merging firms against the potential for efficiency created by
the merger.
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The direct measurement of the post-merger firm's potential for
efficiency makes the comparison between an actual and hypothetical
situation necessary: The decision maker would first have to compute
64
marginal cost at actual levels of production. Then he would have to
estimate marginal cost at hypothetical levels of production for a firm
that will do business in the future. The comparison between both
situations would show if a decrease in marginal cost would result from
the merger.
However, there are already severe problems for measuring actual
efficiencies in a specific acquisition. A vast body of economic
literature exists as to the measurement of efficiencies from mergers.
An overview and discussion of the economic studies shall not be
attempted here. This has been done elsewhere. Most legal scholars
hold that the empirical techniques which have been employed by economists
are difficult and suffer from severe methodological weaknesses. Only
ambiguous evidence of the efficiency results of mergers can be obtained.
Moreover, these measurement approaches span decades and cover a
multitude of firms. They are not designed to prove efficiencies on a
case-by-case basis.
Additionally, it has to be emphasized that certain non-technical
efficiencies are simply not susceptible of measurement. For example,
the superior skill and better judgement of the acquiring company's
management (i.e. managerial economies) can not be quantified. The
same applies to other dynamic efficiencies made possible by an (intended)
adventurous research and development or the (intended) introduction of
121
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new product through greater innovativeness
. Thus, the measurement
of efficiency is, as one commentator points out, "an intractable
69
subject for litigation."
The second variable which would have to be quantified in a
full-blown version of an efficiencies defense is the market power
effect (i.e. deadweiieght-loss) resulting from the merger. In order
to assess if a restriction of output has taken (or will take) place it
would be necessary to know where the marginal cost curve and the
demand curve of a firm intersect. However, it is impossible to
compute these curves.
Thus far only the variables for an efficiencies defense based on
the Williamson tradeoff model have been assessed as to their measurability
.
In Part C it was concluded that Williamson's analysis is too narrow.
Additional factors have to be considered, like the wealth-transfer
potential of mergers, the x-inef f iciency factor, the possibilities for
internal growth and other competitively preferable alternatives, the
cost of rent-seeking behavior and the impact of the merger on the
structure of a market. Again, some of the factors mentioned in Part C
are not susceptible of measurement and others would further exacerbate
the measurement problems.
It can therefore be concluded that the case-by-case balancing of
expected anticompetitive and efficiency effects is unmanageable.
Even if experts would be able to assess efficiencies, judges clearly
lack the economic expertise for performing such a complex balancing
122
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approach. A quantitative assessment of a full-blown efficiencies
defense has no practical value.
b) Any attempt to still implement an efficiencies defense in merger
enforcement would vastly increase the business uncertainty about the
legality of a specific merger. The complexity of an antitrust counselor's
task to determine if a merger results in efficiency gains that could
serve as a basis for justification and the difficulties in conveying
their opinion to their clients will lead to a high degree of uncertainty
of the merging firms. It has already been pointed out that this may
deter the firms from attempting a potentially desirable merger or
provoke them to try out mergers which will be challenged by the
74
enforcement agencies thereby leading to a waste of resources.
The introduction of a case-by-case consideration of efficiencies
into merger analysis would vastly increase investigation and litigation
costs for businesses, enforcers and decisionmakers (i.e. extra time
and other expenses) . Fisher and Laude estimate that the total annual
litigation cost to society for Clavton Act section 7 cases is within
the range of $25 million to $75 million. An efficiencies defense
would raise this cost substantially up to $100 million or more per
75
year.
2 . Limited Versions of an Efficiencies Defense
The survey in chapter I showed that in most cases, limited
versions of an efficiencies defense are advocated as the appropriate
method of taking the social desirability of efficiencies into account.
These proposals attempt to circumvent many of the practical problems
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of a full-blown efficiencies defense in order to minimize business
, , . . . 76
uncertainty and litigation costs.
First, it is often held that efficiencies should only be considered
by the enforcement agencies in the exercise of their prosecut-
orial discretion at the precomplaint stage. In other
words efficiencies should not be treated as a legally cognizable
defense, but prosecutors should merely take this issue into account
when deciding whether to challenge a merger. This policy was
announced in the 1982 F.T.C. Statement and the 198A Merger Guidelines.
(However in the above mentioned AMI-decision the F.T.C. held that
scale-type efficiencies should be made an acceptable defense in merger
80
litigation, while the Reagan-Administration has concurred in its
8
1
1986 Merger Modernization Act. ) Such an approach may avoid some of
the disadvantages of a complete efficiencies defense: A prosecutor
could supply the merging firms with an answer to the efficiency
question faster after taking this matter into consideration informally.
Predictability for businesses might increase. Li" ?ation costs might
decrease.
However, the severe problems of a balancing approach which were
pointed out in subch. 1) are not significantly lessened if a (assumedly
more skilled) prosecutor has to assess the magnitude of the efficiencies
and the relative weight to accord this evidence vis-a-vis the potential
82
market power effects.
Moreover, statements of economists and attorneys from both
.enforcement agencies reveal that the prosecutors will depend heavily
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on testimony from out5 ide counsel, outside economists and management
of the merging firms when evaluating the efficiency story. Thus,
the prosecutors' opinion could be easily biased in favor of the
merger. An objective decision as to the impact of the prospective
efficiency gains seems impossible.
Furthermore, both enforcement agencies operate under the severe
time-restraints of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. It is hard to perceive,
how the complex task of a balancing approach can be sufficiently dealt
with under these conditions. In addition this fact may lead to the
need for obtaining interim relief thereby enlengthening the evaluation
process
.
Even if the enforcement agencies limit their discretion to truly
exceptional cases and impose significant evidentiary requirements en
84
the parties this would most probably not deter firms from trying to
establish a complete efficiencies defense in merger litigation.
Fisher and Laude stress that firms not meeting the prosecutors'
requirements would appeal and allege biased prosecutorial consideration,
The courts would be petitioned to consider the efficiencies "fairly."
Therefore merger litigation would increase.
The proceeding discussion implies that a partial efficiencies
defense limiting the factual inquiry to more easily provable
and more significant efficiencies can not avoid the
disadvantages of a complete case-by-case consideration of efficiencies.
Areeda and Turner employ such an approach and distinguish between
economies where proof problems are (as is contended) less severe (e.g.
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plant size economies), more significant (e.g. distribution economies)
or especially severe (e.g. promotional economies). Consequently
they find that (for this and other reasons) a strong case for recognizing
an efficiencies defense can only be made in the case of plant scale
economies and economics in plant specialization where there is product
complementarity and the diseconomies extend to 70-80 percent of the
firm's output. Concerning all other economies, the case for recognizing
a defense would be relatively weak and only little room for a defense
8 7
would be left. As already mentioned above, the 1982 F.T.C. Statement
limited the efficiencies defense to operating efficiencies in order to
88
minimize measurement difficulties. The 1984 Merger Guidelines
merely expresses concern as to the demonstrability of efficiencies
^^. . . 89
other than operating efficiencies.
A partial efficiencies defense may lessen business uncertainty as
to which efficiencies could justify a specific merger. However, the
task of measuring these efficiencies, quantifying the merger's market-
power effect and balancing these and other variables would remain
unworkable and beyond the limits of reliable adjudication. Investigation
and litigation costs would still increase. Moreover, as Fisher and
Laude emphasize, prosecutors or judges would probably not be able to
limit an efficiencies defense to "most provable" types of evidence,
once the door is opened for the consideration of efficiencies in
merger litigation, firms would try to push the limits of the law and
90judges would have to assess highly speculative and complex evidence.
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3. The AMI and LTV-Republic - Cases
The application of an efficiencies defense in the above mentioned
91 93AMI-decision and the LTV-Republic merger case corroborates that
any efficiencies standard as part of the competitive-effects analysis
is unworkable, leads to increased business uncertainty, increases
investigation costs and ultimately severely diminishes the effectiveness
of the present antimerger statute, section 7 Clayton Act.
The AMI-decision (See Chapter I) is an especially example of the
insurmountable complexity of an efficiencies defense. In the initial
decision the Administrative Law judge, Barnes, had to delve in ambiguous,
contradictory and elusive studies prepared by respondent's management
94
and economic expert. He rejected an efficiencies defense for two
reasons: First, it is foreclosed by precedent clearly rejecting
efficiency arguments in merger cases. (See Part B of this thesis).
Second, Judge Barnes held that "[i]t is extremely difficult for the
fact finder to measure the existence and magnitude of claimed efficiencies
because they often involve assumptions, overstatements, speculations
and questionable methodology offered by an interested party who has
95
control of the supporting information. It is also extremely difficult
to measure how much increased efficiency is needed to outweigh the
,96
expected effects of a merger in terms of an increase in market power."
These practical impediments would militate against an efficiencies
defense. In support of this conclusion the Judge made interesting
findings concerning AMI ' s contentions that the acquisition of French
would create the potential for far-reaching operating cost savings
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(through consolidation and medical services and increased patient
volumes) and capital expenditure savings. Apart from mentioning
several practical barriers which could prevent implementation of the
consolidation. Judge Barnes concluded that it was questionable whether
97
economies of scale actually could be gained through consolidation.
ami's own economic expert had noted that there was inconsistent
evidence as to the existence of scale economies for hospitals. Judge
Barnes cited the expert: "Consolidations undertaken to achieve efficiency,
economic security, operating surplus and improved capabilities for
meeting future demands may be ill-advised. The consolidation pre ess
itself is complicated, costly and uncertain. Those contemplating a
merger should recall that the return-to-scale efficiencies expected in
go
many mergers are never realized." Furthermore, the Judge neatly
scrutinized a study which was prepared by the respondents' management
and found that the estimates of operating cost savings had a number of
questionable assumptions and omissions that resulted in overstating
99
the amount of saving that the hospitals' consolidation would generate.
Oblivious of the severe practical problems of an efficiencies
defense which had been so clearly delineated by Judge Barnes, the
F.T.C. Commission's opinion proceeds to recognize a limited efficiencies
defense as a legally cognizable defense not just as a factor for
consideration in the exercise of the agency's prosecutorial discretion.
By misinterpretating the precedent concerning the availability of an
efficiencies defense in merger analysis, the Commission concludes that
the Supreme Court decisions only reflect "a bias against assertion of
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the efficiencies justification of Section 7 cases" and that this bias
amounts to nothing more than dicta. The Commission follows closely
the arguments which had been advanced by Timothy Huris, Director of
the FTC's Bureau of Competition in his law review article. The
article has been extensively criticized for its misconceptions by the
author of this thesis. Ultimately, however, the Commission finds that
AMI could not establish that substantial efficiencies existed.
The case-history of the LTV-Republic merger , which has been
briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, is probably the most obvious example
do the failure of an efficiencies defense.
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After the initial challenge of the merger on February 15, 1984
the Assistant Attorney General (Antitrust Division) McGrath declared
in a speech on March 8, 1984 that his department had devoted "substantial
resources" to analyzing the companies' claims concerning potential
103
efficiency gains. Our staff spent several weeks on site investigating
the companies' operations; we hired the highly respected British firm
of steel experts — Atkins Planning — as an outside consultant; and I
personally visited several of the companies' steel mills to gain a
104first-hand understanding." These remarks demonstrate the enormous
costs involved in assessing a merger's efficiency story. Obviously
the prosecutors could undertake such an investigation only in a few
cases. In the end the Department found that "only a fraction of the
claimed cost savings was attributable solely to the proposed merger.
The majority of the realizable savings could be achieved without the
•complete consolidation sought by the companies." Only twelve days
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later on March 20, 1984 McGrath, in explaining the acceptabilitj^ of a
restructured merger, was suddenly much more favorable to the
efficiency claims of the merging firms and took pains to outline
efficiencies resulting from the functional consolidation of the
companies' sheet steel plants situated on opposite sides of the
Cuyohoga River in Cleveland. McGrath's last assessment, however,
proved to be wrong. LTV-Republlc is now fighting for its survival. A
news report on September 29, 1985 sums up the events following the
merger: "[...] after hundreds of millions of dollars in losses,
extensive layoffs and plant closings, the jury still is out on the
merger, industry analysts and company officials say.
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Conclusion
E. A Proposed Public Interest Exemption Clause
The proper theoretical basis for assessing the role of efficiencies
in merger control law remains the concept of preserving competition as
a process which both the German and U. S .-American Law have adopted.
An effective competition is the best guarantor for the achievement of
productive efficiency. It compels rationalizations and compels firms
to reduce prices and better the quality of their products. In other
words, only the continuous spur of competition assures that firms will
realize potential efficiencies and, even more important, pass these
2
gains on to the consumer. In addition, the preservation of a competitive
market structure harmonize these economic concerns with non-economic
concerns such as the distrust of business power and the protection of
the freedom of economic opportunity as well as other political and
social concerns with a rising concentration in the industry. These
are valid and important objectives which any merger control law must
address
.
In most cases a tough antimerger law does not conflict with the
4
attainment of efficiencies through mergers. However, individual case
studies show that some big mergers tend to produce efficiencies, i.e.
a merger leading to a less competitive market structure will result in
efficiencies. Thus, a tradeoff between competition and efficiency
may be presented. There are strong methodological reasons to neglect
all efficiency claims of firms raised in defense of an anticompetitive
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merger (see Part D)
.
Nevertheless, it shall be argued that on the
basis of the stringent test in section 7 of the Clayton Act
determining whether a proposed acquisition is anticompetitive, a
limited public-interest exemption clause should be implemented. The
scope of such a clause must be carefully delineated in order to assure
that an effective antimerger policy under section 7 Clayton Act will
not be undermined. Section 2A(3) GWB can serve as a model for the
affirmative consideration of efficiencies in merger analysis (see Part
B II 2c.).
It remains to be asked at what stage the social desirability of
efficiencies should be incorporated, into U. S. -American merger control
law. The evaluation of a merger's competitive effects on a particular
market and the affirmative consideration of efficiencies in the
context of the public interest exemption clause have to be treated as
two separate entities.
On a first level of analysis efficiencies achieved through a
merger can be of considerable importance when assessing the competitive
effects of a merger. It was pointed out in Part B that efficiencies
leading to competitive advantages of firms can have a benign or
malignant impact on the competitive conditions of a market. Respectively,
they can be called pro- or anticompetitive. At this stage of the
analysis no further inquiry as to whether the efficiencies are socially
desirable or not shall be undertaken. This is strictly an examination
of the competitive effects of a merger. Part D demonstrated that an
efficiencies defense as part of a competitive - effects test would
render an antimerger statute ineffective.
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On a second level of analysis the social desirability of efficiencies
can be assessed in the context of a public-interest exemption clause.
This evaluation is a matter of economic policy. Therefore the Federal
Minister of Economics undertakes such an examination under German
merger control law. Under U. S .-American merger control law the social
desirability of efficiencies can only be taken into account by the
enforcement agencies in determining whether to initiate an action
under section 7 Clayton Act. Thus, there is a considerable danger
that the competitive-effects analysis and the public-interest evaluation
will be lumped together. The enforcement agencies must therefore be
required to make a specific certification that the attainment of
efficiencies serves the public interest and is a reason for not
challenging the anticompetitive merger. As a component of the merger
litigation this certification should constitute a separate issue for
adjudication.
The scope of such an efficiency defense must be narrow. As has
been pointed out, only the competitive forces in a market guarantee
that productive efficiency gains will be achieved and passed on to the
consumer not the will of an individual firm. The proposed clause
represents a departure from this principle. It applies after the
competitive - effects analysis has determined that the merger will
lead to a weakening of the spur of competition. Moreover, it has to
be noted that an anticompetitive merger results in long-term detrimental
effects on the competitive process, permanently affecting the consumers
and competitors. In contrast, the microeconomlc advantages of efficiencies
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may only last for a short period of time. Thus, the affirmative
consideration of efficiencies must remain an exception. The parameters
of such an efficiencies defense have been developed in Part B II. 2c
and Part C of this thesis. Only substantial real economies that are
unique to the merger and are clearly in the public interest can
justify an anticompetitive merger.
The limitations of Section 24(3) GWB and its careful application
by the Federal Minister of Economics have prevented a diminished
effectiveness of German merger control law. This German statute
provides a useful frame for addressing claims of efficiencies raised
in defense of an otherwise anticompetitive merger. The inclusion of a
public interest exemption clause in U. S .-American merger analysis
would serve to quiet some of the criticism directed against section 7
Clayton Act.
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